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Abstract

Cybersecurity is a pressing issue. Researchers have proposed numerous security solutions
over the years in order to combat security issues but it is still common to find known, well understood
security issues in production environments. In this thesis, I seek to find the underlying reasons to
why existing security solutions and best practices are not consistently applied and how to improve
the utilization of secure best practices. To this end, I adopt the anthropological research method of
long term participant observation and embed myself in real-world settings in order to understand
the existence of security issues and the perception of security from a “native’s point of view”.
First, I conducted an in-depth, six-month embedding in a traffic management center (TMC)
of a mid-size city in the U.S. to gain first-hand knowledge of the cyber-security issues in vehicular
transportation systems, which is a multi-disciplinary field with combined contributions from civil &
transportation engineering, traffic engineering, electrical engineering, communications engineering,
and computer science. We identify the existence of silos of different disciplines, making it difficult
to understand and communicate the security impact one can have in the context of the whole
transportation ecosystem. Based on our observations, we present a systematization framework
which identifies key components, technologies, and stakeholders in the whole ecosystem which forms
the basis for understanding attack scenarios, their impacts and mitigations. This methodology helps
to put security analysis into the context of the transportation ecosystem and provides a common
platform for communication to help break down the silos existing both in research and in practice.
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Next, I conducted an eight-month long ethnographic study of a software development company to explore if and how a development team adopts security practices into the development
lifecycle. This effort involved working as a software engineer and participating in all development
activities as a new hire would. During the fieldwork, I observed a positive shift in the development
team’s practice regarding secure development. Our analysis of data indicates that the shift can be
attributed to enabling all software engineers to see how security knowledge could be applied to the
specific software products they worked on. I also observed that by working with other developers
to apply security knowledge under the concrete context where the software products were built,
developers who possessed security expertise and wanted to push for more secure development practices (security advocates) were more effective in achieving this goal. Our data analysis point to an
interactive learning process where software engineers acquire knowledge, apply it in practice, and
contribute to the team, leading to the creation of a set of preferred practices which is often collectively referred to as “company culture.” This learning process can be understood through the lens
of the situated learning framework, where it is recognized that knowledge transfer happens within
a community of practice, and applying the knowledge is the key in individuals (software engineers)
acquiring it and the community (the company) embodying such knowledge in its practice. Our data
show that enabling a situated learning environment for security gives rise to security-aware software
engineers. I discuss the roles of management and security advocates in driving the learning process
to start a security culture in a software company.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don’t understand
the problems and you don’t understand the technology.” — Secrets and Lies by Bruce
Schneier [87]

Cybersecurity is a not solely a technical problem but a socio-technical problem where human
factors play a crucial role in the security of the system. Over the years, the focus on human factors
in security has seen the rise of the field of usable security which has yielded ample improvements
in security of software products as security designs have been catered more towards the end-users.
With tremendous growth in the number of software products and, with it, security vulnerabilities,
the usable security community also expanded their focus from end-users to software developers. As
not all software developers were seen to have adequate security expertise [118], onus was placed
on improving security tools such as APIs of programming libraries, development tools, and vulnerability discovery tools [2, 38, 110, 111, 118]. Even with the development of numerous security
tools to assist software developers in writing secure code, the same (or similar) security bugs and
vulnerabilities have kept recurring in production environments even when known secure solutions
are readily available. In this thesis, I seek to understand why known security issues keep recurring
and existing security knowledge and solutions are not applied in practice, and how to dampen this
trend.
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Early work from 2002 by Gonzalez and Sawicka [35] postulate the necessity to collaborate
with companies and organizations in order to better understand the role of human factors in security
of systems. In order to answer the questions above, we collaborate with organizations in two distinct
problem domains:
1. Vehicular transportation system: We collaborate with a transportation management center
(TMC), which is an operational center for the city-wide traffic management.
2. Software development: We collaborate with a development team of a software company.
Sundaramurthy et al. [94, 95] were the first to adopt the anthropological research method of
long-term participant observation to study security operations centers (SOCs). This study provided
deep insights into the problem of burnout in SOCs [94] and proposed technical solutions to improve
operational efficiency [95]. Inspired by their success, we also adopt long-term participant observation
to conduct both our studies. Chapter 2 describes the details of data collection using participant
observation and subsequent analysis using general inductive approach.
First, in Chapter 3, I describe my six-month long embedding at a TMC of a mid-sized
city in the U.S. I first describe the field work setting and my first-hand experience of the daily
activities conducted by a TMC staff. This is followed by the non-invasive security evaluation of
the technologies utilized in the TMC. This evaluation was restrictive due to the potential consequences of working in a live system overlooking over 550 traffic signals. Nonetheless, it gave me the
opportunity to identify existing security issues, verify the threats identified in the literature, and
understand the TMC operators perspective towards security. On analysis of the fieldnotes, we make
a key observation that the existence of silos of different engineering disciplines makes it difficult to
understand and communicate security issues and their impacts in the context of the whole trans-
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portation ecosystem. We also find that the research efforts in this domain are often fragmented,
targeting only specific segments of the system, and hence fail to capture the overarching context of
the whole transportation system. This failure to communicate security issues and their impacts on
the transportation system contributes to the failure to utilize the available secure solutions. Based
on these observations, we find that a coherent framework capturing the key components, technologies, and stakeholders will benefit the management and operation of such systems as well as the
design process of future systems and system components.
The contributions of this study at the TMC are as follows:
1. In Section 3.7, I present the observations from the embedding in the TMC which led to a
two-tiered framework to study and evaluate the security posture of the transportation system
as a whole, presented in Section 3.8
2. In Section 3.9, this framework is utilized to organize existing transportation security knowledge
found in literature, to understand existing threats, attack techniques, mitigations, and the
stakeholders responsible for prevention and mitigation. We use this process to identify common
causes for the discovered vulnerabilities and evaluate the suggested countermeasures where
possible.
In Chapter 4, I present the second study, which is focused on the implementation of secure development practices in a software development company. I joined the development team as a new hire
and fully participant in all development activities such as scrum meetings, design/implementation
discussions, code review, testing, documentation, and so on. I was fortunate to join the company
two months after the management decision to implement secure software development lifecycle (S-
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SDLC) which provided us the opportune moment to conduct research into whether and how such a
push for security may result in concrete positive changes in the development processes.
In Section 4.3 and 4.4, I present the observations of eight months of fieldwork including the
evolution of the S-SDLC, the role of a security expert within the development team, identification
of challenges faced, and how they were overcome in time to lead to a positive shift in the development team’s practice regarding secure development. Our analysis of the fieldnotes reveal that an
interactive learning process exists within the development team where software engineers acquire
knowledge, apply it in practice, and contribute to the team, leading to the establishment of a set of
preferred practices which is often collectively referred to as the “team culture.” This learning cycle is
central to the successful establishment of secure preferred practices and, hence, start a security culture within the team. The learning process within the development team is described in Section 4.5
and the key enablers of the positive shift in secure development is described in Section 4.6. We also
provide recommendations to software development companies based on our findings in Section 4.8.
The main contributions of this study of a software development team are as follows:
1. We identify an important factor in establishing secure development practices in a software
company — the role of situated learning [62] that forms an integral part of software engineers’
work. Rather than assuming structured processes on their own can solve security problems,
we examine the context for learning about security within the development environment and
analyze how it shapes the workflows followed by individual software engineers. Our analysis
of data shows that what was driving the positive shift in the development team’s security
awareness can be explained by the learning dynamics existent therein, in particular the software engineers being able to identify the applicability of the security knowledge within the
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context of the everyday work they perform. The situated learning dynamics could drive the
team into a set of agreed-upon knowledge and the associated practices, becoming the “preferred practices” for dealing with specific security concerns. We hence identify a way to start
a secure coding culture in a development team.
2. Our data also indicate that the presence of a security expert working within the development
team is instrumental in driving the situated learning cycle for security. It appears that when
such security experts are part of the development team, and their actions foster the learning
process, the adoption of secure coding practices become more readily accepted by the team.
In particular, we find it important that security knowledge be offered within the context of
the team’s concrete work.
Both of these longitudinal studies provided me the opportunity to observe real-world operations and interact with professionals in the field. By studying the problem within the context of
where it occurs, I was able to extract valuable insights that are otherwise difficult to obtain through
snapshots-in-time studies such as controlled experiments or through interviews/surveys which rely
on self-reported data. This approach also benefits from the fact that it allows us to study people as a collective, as opposed to individually, which helps us uncover different social dynamics
as well. Hence, I believe long-term participant observation through collaborations with companies/organizations is a valuable tool to better understand the role of human-factors in security of
systems.

5

1.1

Reading Guide
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the anthropological

research method utilized to collect data through participant observation and data analysis using
general inductive approach. Chapter 3 describes the fieldwork at a transportation management
center and details the systematization framework proposed. Chapter 4 describes the fieldwork at a
software development company and explores the implications of situated learning in establishing a
security culture in a software development team.
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology

This thesis describes the findings from long-term studies at two different locations, namely,
a Transportation Management Center (TMC) and a Software development company. The primary
research method employed for both of these studies was long-term participant observation — a
qualitative research method developed by anthropologists and sociologists to study human behavior
in their natural setting in order to gain a better understanding of local practices and their culture.
This chapter describes participant observation, data collection, and data analysis within the context
of our research. We also discuss the limitations of this approach compared to other approaches.
The specifics of each fieldwork are discussed in the corresponding chapters.

2.1

Participant Observation
Participant observation is a qualitative research method in which the researcher spends a long

period of time (typically over a year) as a member of the community being studied. Being embedded
within the community allows the researcher to participate and observe day-to-day activities of
the people within the community. Such constant involvement within the community allows the
researcher to obtain strong understanding of the local practices from a native perspective.
The participant observer in this research was a computer science Ph.D. student with background in security and ample industry experience. In preparation for this research, the computer
science Ph.D. student was enrolled in applied research methods class from the Department of Anthro-
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pology and additionally underwent extended training in participant observation under the guidance
of the anthropologist in the research team.

2.2

Data Analysis
The participant observer (PO) maintained descriptive field notes on daily work activities

and interactions with other employees in the field. These notes included “as is” descriptions and
avoided personal opinions or commentary. The raw field note data was analyzed using the general
inductive approach [97], augmented by specific techniques for qualitative data analysis [10]. After
a period of data collection, the research team met weekly to discuss and reflect on the observations
made so far. The team went over the events of the past week and discussed the events concerning
local practices, security practices, and the relevant interactions. The PO tagged the raw field data
based on the patterns and themes that emerged during these discussions. Any unanswered questions
and/or missing information during these discussions then guided the future observations in the field.
The weekly iteration of data collections followed by in-depth discussions led to the refinement of the
emerging categories used for coding. Then, as broader themes were conceptualized, the PO started
to write analytic notes summarizing each theme and documenting ideas and analysis of each along
with supporting data from relevant sources in addition to the raw fieldwork data. After the end of
the fieldwork, the research team continued further analysis of data through extensive discussions to
draw out the major implications of the observations.
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2.3

Research Ethics
The study was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). Researchers

explained the study goals to participants and obtained verbal informed consent from participants.
Field notes were anonymized, as well as discussions during weekly research meetings.
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Chapter 3: Study 1 — Vehicular Transportation System

3.1

Background
Vehicle transportation infrastructure is undergoing fundamental changes with the converging

of traditional closed systems and the Internet-driven new technologies to improve efficiency, mobility,
safety, comfort, and convenience. It is a multi-disciplinary field with combined contributions from
the civil & transportation engineering, traffic engineering, electrical engineering, communications
engineering, and computer science and engineering. With rapid advancements in technology and
improved connectivity, introduction of connected and autonomous vehicles is leading the technologydriven revolution of the transportation systems. The increased connectivity within and between
vehicles, and between vehicles and the transportation infrastructure is driving the transformation
at an accelerated pace. These advancements have made possible vast improvements and created an
enormous market for rapid deployment of feature-rich vehicles and infrastructure equipment. Like
in all domains, the dramatic increase in the use of technology and connectivity also opens up new
threats from cyber attacks.
A significant challenge in understanding the cybersecurity risk in a system like vehicle transportation is that it requires the understanding of an ecosystem consisting of multiple non-trivial
physical systems as well as the various stake holders involved in their design and operation. A
vehicle is made by manufacturers and driven by humans (and/or computer programs) on the road,
whose road-side infrastructures are built and maintained by public entities such as municipal and
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state governments. These days both cars and infrastructures can communicate with third-party
vendors in the cloud, providing/receiving information that impact their operations. With the influx
of technology in every component and increase in the connectivity between them, the influence of
each component on the other is greater than ever before. The dependencies thus created means
that security vulnerabilities are no longer isolated to a particular component, thus making it much
harder to contemplate without understanding the whole transportation ecosystem. It is not surprising that security risks in such a complex and inter-connected system can be both numerous and
nuanced. Existing work in vehicle transportation cybersecurity has tended to focus on parts of the
overall ecosystem, e.g., vehicles, traffic lights, etc. While (not surprisingly) many attack avenues
were discovered, it is not often clear why these problems are there in the first place (beyond blaming
users or developers), how to prevent them from being introduced, and how to mitigate them through
cost-effective methods if elimination is not a practical option. To answer these questions a holistic
framework to systematize cybersecurity issues in the vehicle transportation ecosystem is beneficial.
With such a framework one can have a better understanding of the potential vulnerabilities when
designing a system, have a quicker grasp of the risk when operating on the systems, and have a
more meaningful perspectives on how to mitigate them in reality.
This chapter

1

describes the six month long embedding at a transportation management

center (TMC) of a mid-size city in the U.S. This effort provided first-hand knowledge of the
inner workings of the vehicle transportation ecosystem through direct access to a real-world TMC
and interactions with people from multiple engineering disciplines including transportation, traffic
engineering, computer and communications, and others. This chapter starts by describing the
specifics of the fieldwork setup before moving on to the observations at the TMC. The following
1

This chapter was published as a technical report [102]

11

section looks at the cyber-security risks prevalent in the vehicular transportation system. Finally, we
describe and discuss our systematization framework identifying the key components, technologies,
and stakeholders in the whole ecosystem and forming the basis of understanding attack scenarios
and their mitigations.

3.2

Research Team
The research team for this work comprised of me, the participant observer (PO), a computer

science professor specializing in systems security, specialists in civil and transportation engineering
including a Ph.D. student, a post doctoral researcher, and a professor in civil engineering, and a
professor in anthropology.

3.3

Fieldwork Setting
A TMC is typically operated by local and state authorities and covers a specific geographic

area based on its jurisdiction. A TMC provides a direct lens for understanding the domain knowledge
required for security evaluation of the entire transportation ecosystem. We conducted in-depth
fieldwork with researchers embedded in the TMC, run by a medium-size U.S. city operating over
550 traffic signals with the goal of optimizing the travel time throughout the city. A combination of
fiber optics cables, twisted copper wire, and wireless communication connected hundreds of traffic
cabinets to the central TMC. The TMC housed dedicated servers to run software applications used
by traffic engineers to monitor real-time traffic and operate signal cabinets. It used an in-house test
cabinet to train new employees and test new signal timings.
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The PO spent a few days every week (roughly five hours each visit) depending on the TMC
schedule, working primarily with seven members of the team, for a duration of six months, observing
daily operational activities and participating where possible. The PO first went through training on
basic traffic engineering and various tools used during daily operations. The PO then participated
in daily operations which included collecting travel time data, creating/updating signal timing,
operation of reversible lanes, monitoring and analyzing signal timing reports, and incident response
(failures, accidents, and client complaints).

3.4

Methodology
The fieldwork data was analyzed using the general inductive approach described in Section 2.

The descriptive field notes was used to record the daily work, the systems used in various tasks, and
interactions with the engineers at the TMC. Given that one initial goal of the embedding was to
understand the system, the PO also maintained separate notes focused on the technical information
and dimensions related to vehicle transportation system security. Both the anthropological and the
technical field notes were subject to the analysis and helped develop plans for subsequent research
visits. This fieldwork was part of a larger interdisciplinary project and was reviewed and approved
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The findings reported here are limited to the knowledge
gained by the PO through access to the physical artifacts and the interactions with the professionals
at the TMC.

3.5

Training
The first few weeks of the fieldwork was training on the traffic engineering fundamentals

focused on performing signal timing calculations. The traffic engineers on duty trained the PO on
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the fundamentals of signal timing calculations and demonstrated the systems and tools that they
used on a daily basis to maintain efficient signal timing throughout the city. The PO was then
assigned to assist in re-timing the signal plan for a major corridor along four intersections and
carried out the following tasks:

1. Collected travel time data during the morning peak hour (9:30 AM — 10:30 AM) from the
field along the corridor.
2. Calculated appropriate parameters for the signal controller to use such as clearance times
for pedestrians to provide maximum safety margins, as well as the offset times required for
coordinated signal timings along the corridor.
3. Programmed the new signal timing in the test signal controller. Any new signal timing was
first programmed in the test cabinet and left to run for at least 24 hours before reprogramming
the on-field signal cabinet.

During this process, the PO gained first hand experience with the systems in place at the
intersection for vehicle detection, the internals of the traffic cabinet including signal controller,
malfunction management unit (MMU), network devices to connect back to the TMC, and the applications used by the traffic engineers to monitor and configure the signal controllers. All of the
intersections are connected to the central TMC by either twisted copper pair wires, fiber-optics cables, or wireless connections and forms the air-gapped communication network. Based on the type
of connection, the city operates two distinct systems to monitor and configure the traffic signals
throughout the city: (1) Metropolitan Traffic Control System (MTCS) is an older intersection controller application which runs on the Microsoft DOS operating system and is deployed to manage the
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the Transportation Ecosystem. The figure shows all the components of
the transportation ecosystem and the enabling technologies.
traffic signals at intersections which are only connected via twisted copper pair wires. (2) Econolite
Centracs [25] which is an Advanced Traffic Management System (ATMS) solution and is used to
manage the traffic intersections connected via fiber optics or wireless links. Both of these applications were deployed in in-house servers. Dedicated workstations are also assigned to use these
applications. These workstations are separate from the internet-connected personal workstations to
maintain the air-gapped transportation network.

3.5.1 Transportation System Overview
Based on our observations, we visualize the transportation system as an ecosystem of various
different technologies as in Figure 3.1. The main component is the millions of vehicles on the road,
including specialized public transit and emergency response vehicles. Vehicles dominate the transportation ecosystem in terms of both the number and the technological advancement and research.
Vehicles have evolved from traditional mechanical systems to complex computing-mechanical systems consisting of hundreds of sensors, dozens of control devices from electronic control units, or
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ECUs, to infotainment systems, and now to connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) capable of
communicating amongst each other and with the infrastructure and cloud services that provides
large-scale data analytics and inference capabilities. Dozens of vendors contribute to the manufacturing and development of vehicles, driven by the demands from end-user customers.
The vehicles, end-users, and the transportation infrastructure interface with each other
mainly through the devices on the road intersections such as vehicle detectors, traffic lights, and
dynamic message signs (DMS). This interface capability is extended by the use of mobile devices
and various applications and further improved by the introduction of connected vehicles. The input
interface for the transportation system are the sensing technologies, feeding data into the roadside
component. Based on these inputs, the roadside equipment in turn control the output interfaces.
To maintain efficient and safe traffic flow throughout, the roadside equipment are connected
to each other and to the TMC through various communication channels (fiber optics, wireless, etc.).
Daily monitoring and efficient operation of the transportation system is the responsibility of the
TMC operators. TMC may host several servers supporting the operations of the roadside units
and various applications utilized by the operators to perform their daily tasks. They might also be
connected to other third-party cloud services through virtual private networks (VPNs).
Transportation system is a critical infrastructure of the modern society with practically
everyone utilizing its services. Hence, regulators at various levels enforce standards and rules to
ensure safe and secure functioning of this system. This includes standards and rules imposed on
the end-users (traffic laws), operators (procedures to follow) and vendors (types of technology to
use and standards to maintain).
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3.6

Security Evaluation
After the completion of training, we conducted a non-invasive security analyses, with a

particular focus on how the in-house testbed worked in the context of the overall management of
the transportation system. This gave us the opportunity to verify whether threats identified in
the broader literature were present in a real-world setting. However, operating on a live system
with potential for severe consequences restricted our experimentation but at the same time offered
opportunities to understand the security posture of a real system as well as understand the operators
view towards security.

3.6.1 Intersection
During our fieldwork we learned that incorrect sensing data was a concern for the TMC
engineers. While the concerns were mostly for malfunction, deliberate attacks would worsen the
situation.
One existing problematic scenario is pedestrian button being stuck in the ON position,
equivalent to receiving fake sensing data. The maximum impact occurs at intersections between a
major corridor and a rarely used side-street activated only on vehicle/pedestrian detection. This
causes unnecessary red lights on the main corridor while the side street is always serviced even when
no vehicles/pedestrians are present. The impact is harder to observe as operators have to analyze
travel time data to observe sub-optimal traffic conditions.
In another scenario we found in the TMC, a public complaint reported that the left turn
green phase was being skipped even when vehicles were present in the lane during evening time
windows. It turned out that the skipped phase was on the east-west corridor of an intersection using
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Figure 3.2: Signal Cabinet
video-based detection, which suffered from a sun-glare at evening time causing missed detections.
Yan et al. [122] demonstrated missed detections in millimeter-ware (MMW) radars (used in Tesla
cars) and video-based detection. While this work is focused on sensors on vehicles, similar attacks
can be effective for sensors in intersections as well.

3.6.2 Signal Cabinet
Figure 3.2 shows the test signal cabinet. These are present at the side of the roads with
signalized intersections. Although the signal cabinets are locked, they utilize standardized locks
with Corbin style #2 keys which are readily available for purchase. We also found that although
signal controllers provide password protection and access control capabilities, they are not utilized
in practice. The reasoning behind both of these is the fact different field operators need to access the
cabinets which makes physical key and credential management cumbersome for daily operations.
Ghena et al. [32] report that even when authentication is enabled, they utilize the default settings.

18

We also found that, with physical access, the intersection could be sent to all-way flashing
red state trivially by: (i) removing a load switch, or (ii) updating the signal timing on the controller
to violate safety conditions such as minimum yellow time, minimum all red time, and no conflicting
greens. In this case, the Malfunction Management Unit (MMU)/Cabinet Monitor Unit (CMU)
sends the intersection to all-way flashing red to maintain the safety property. MMU identifies
conflict status through hard-wired programming card [72] or a serial memory key (datakey) [49].
However, we found that with the knowledge of how the permissive states are defined in MMU/CMU,
availability of modifiable hard-wire programming card for training purposes, and physical access to
the unit, adversaries can modify or replace it to allow unsafe conflicting green state. This, combined
with signal timing manipulation can create catastrophic conditions.
During the fieldwork, with access to the network, we were able to gain root access on
Econolite signal controllers as it exposed ssh service setup with default user name and password.
Using this we could trigger system reboots, modify/remove essential programs, or carry out denialof-service (DoS) attacks on the controller. Although not used by the TMC, we were informed that
some of the cabinets are equipped with WiFi dongles which allows the field operators to get on the
network to access to the controllers without opening cabinet. This would even allow remote exploits
of the same kind.
Although MMU/CMU maintains safe conditions and requires physical tampering for complete bypass, unsafe conditions can still be created by pushing the signal timing to the edge of
conflict condition. During our fieldwork we were able to program a signal timing with one second
flickering green light without triggering the MMU. This is possible since the MMU only checks for
minimum all red and yellow phases and has no restriction for the green phase. This, at the very
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least, can lead to confusion and annoyance to the public at intersections with low speed limit but
may lead to fatal accidents when the speed limits are higher and the vehicles are unable to stop
in time. This result shows that attackers can drive intersections into unsafe signal conditions, even
with MMU/CMU present as the final line of defense.
During our embedding, we were able to disrupt the signal timing synchronization on a test
signal controller by short-circuiting two pins on the GPS, thereby sending a false signal to reset the
controller’s local clock to the programmed reference time without triggering any faults or alerts on
the system. This can greatly impact the traffic flow. While in our experiments we did have physical
access to the RSU, with the rise of network-connected field devices, remote access to the devices
from close proximity, or even through the network is possible. With such access, adversaries can
miscalibrate sensors, install malicious firmware, or gain access to other devices that trust it.

3.6.3 Application Security
The Metropolitan Traffic Control System (MTCS) is an older intersection controller application running on Microsoft DOS which does not support any modern security features and does
not even require basic authentication. This is also inadequate from an operational security point
of view, as the weak monitoring system means that attacks can go unnoticed. ASC3 (kdClient,
utility, configurator) is a set of tools to provide direct connection to a ASC/3 signal controller for
configuring pin assignments and signal timing [24]. Any signal controller on the network can be
connected to based on IP address without authenticating.
More modern applications do provide some security mechanisms such as authentication and
additional features useful for operational security. Centracs is used for configuration and monitoring
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of Econolite controllers throughout the network [25]. For operational security, it provides device log
management, generates alerts for fault conditions, and can generate reports for further analysis if
required. It also tracks configuration updates along with user information. DYNAC’s DynGate [51]
is for operation of reversible lanes. It provides interfaces to inference system for scanning the
roadway for vehicles, and control technology for operation of lane barriers/gates and corresponding
signs. This is a safety critical application with potential to prevent (or create with malicious intent)
devastating conditions.

3.6.4 Network Security
We found that although the transportation communication network is air-gapped from direct
internet access, external access to the backend servers is provided to the third-party vendors for
management and maintenance of the application servers.
We also found that third-party applications such as connected signals app [19], which displays
real-time traffic light predictions at each intersection, receive data directly from the TMC. This
was accomplished via a Raspberry Pi [130] device directly connected to the transportation network
in order to transmit the signal timing. We were assured that no incoming traffic was accepted from
that device. Such cases undermine the air-gapped assumption of the transportation communication
network and changes the threat landscape.
Other monitoring applications include BlueTOAD [99] which utilizes data collected from
traveller’s bluetooth-enabled devices at various intersections. Waze Traffic View [114] and Waycare [113] utilize crowd sourced and other open data sources. Although these applications have less
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security implications, adversarial access can misinform operators which can hide issues or lead to
incorrect decision making.

3.7

Anthropological Observations and Findings
Section 3.6 described security issues prevalent in a real-world transportation management

system. This helped us identify cyber-security threats as well as verify some of the threats reported in
literature. During this process, the PO also maintained descriptive field-notes which gave us insights
into different perceptions of security, threats, and mitigations within the professionals working in
the TMC. Next, we discuss our experiences and findings.

3.7.1 Challenges in Communication
Perhaps the most important experience during this fieldwork is that efficient communication presented a major challenge during the fieldwork. Field operators and computer/civil/traffic
engineers were all working in the same environment. The perspective of the transportation infrastructure was different for each individual. Take, for example, a discussion on signal cabinets
and security. The field operator focused on how a person can access the signal cabinet; the traffic
engineer focused on the potential undesired conditions that may arise due to changes in the signal
timings; the computer engineer focused on the signal controller, software running on it, and network
connection; and the civil engineer focused on the planning aspect and the impact it may have on
the entire road network.
In this case, the field operator asked “can attackers physically access the signal cabinets?” 2
The traffic engineer asked “what damage can attackers cause if given access to signal cabinets?” The
2

These and others are not direct quotes.
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computer engineer asked “can attackers gain access to devices in signal cabinets?” And the civil
engineer asked “what can be the impact of such malicious actions?” All these points of view are
important to understand in order to perform a security risk analysis of the transportation system.
Throughout the fieldwork, we interacted with people from multiple disciplines including
transportation, traffic engineering, computer and communications engineering. Each of these fields
have a unique role to play in the design, implementation, and operation of the transportation
system. We observe the existence of silos of each discipline, making it difficult to understand and
communicate the security impact one can have in the context of the whole transportation ecosystem.
This echoes what we find in the relevant research literature, where in many cases security issues
identified stem from assumptions made about other aspects of the ecosystem, regardless of whether
such assumptions can hold or not.

3.7.2 Need for Systematization of Knowledge
When analysing the field notes, we found that cybersecurity-related discussions were better
facilitated when the relevant technologies were considered in an abstract way. At times, discussions
focused solely on the purpose of the relevant technology in the current transportation system managed by the TMC, often getting into disciplinary minutiae that did not promote interdisciplinary
understanding of security concerns. In contrast, more general discussions of problems facilitated risk
analysis because people could draw on and apply knowledge about cyber attacks in other systems
to their own. For example, when discussing cyber attacks on wireless in-pavement vehicle detectors,
the initial response was that those were not used here and hence was not of concern. On further
discussion, abstracting away the wireless in-pavement vehicle detectors to just “sensors” allowed the
discussion to proceed leading to the understanding that a “sensor” (any sensor) compromised by
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any means can lead to missed detections or false detections. This then led to risk assessment in the
sensors deployed in this TMC.
On further reflection, we realized that the abstraction of technology not only helped in
communicating security issues to experts of different disciplines, but also could aid security analysis.
The abstracted technology view helped to drive the discussion of cybersecurity issues in vehicle
transportation system. But then people involved in the TMC needed to connect the abstract view of
specifics, in particular how the potential effects of compromised technologies could affect the specific
transportation ecosystem managed by the TMC. Relating contextual information to abstract issues
mattered in whether people acted or not to address security concerns. We believe that systematizing
security issues that may arise will not only benefit the management and operation of such systems,
but also the design process of future systems and system components which are undergoing rapid
technological advancement.

3.8

Systematization Framework
Based on our experiences during the fieldwork, we find that systematizing security knowledge

about vehicle transportation system can benefit from a two-tiered structure, the first tier describing the overall transportation ecosystem, and the second tier describing the various technologies
involved. We find that applying this two-tiered framework can help communicate security issues
to different disciplines and understand existing threats, attack techniques, mitigations, and stakeholder responsibilities. It could also benefit systematic risk/security analysis in existing systems or
the design of future systems.
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3.8.1 Approach
The transportation system is a technological ecosystem: a complex interconnected network
of multiple components interacting with each other, utilizing various types of independent and interdependent technologies which are influenced by different stakeholders at various stages of development. We propose a systematization approach to provide a holistic context for the transportation
ecosystem. The holistic view makes it easier to capture the interactions between the elements of the
ecosystem and provides a coherent framework to evaluate the security properties of the ecosystem.
Our systematization utilizes a two-tier view of the transportation ecosystem to facilitate
discussion and understanding. We call the first tier component view, whereby we categorize the
transportation ecosystem into components, providing the logical separation of the various aspects of
the ecosystem. This is the logical dimension of the ecosystem. The second tier is called technological
view, whereby we identify the key classes of technologies that enable the functionality of these
components. This is the functional dimension of the ecosystem. To aid security analysis, we
identify key security issues faced by these classes of technologies, common mitigation approaches
used, and the stakeholders involved. This approach is illustrated in Fig. 3.3. We have presented this
systematization approach to a different state-level TMC that operated in the same city, as well as
to a transportation research institute where people from diverse domains attended. In each of these
experiences, we found that the systematization was well received and helped to open up discussion
of security issues from people in multiple disciplines.
We want to emphasize that both these dimensions are important in our systematization. The
logical dimension provides the context in which a component resides in the overall transportation
ecosystem, thus the same type of security issues will have varying implications based on differing
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Figure 3.3: Systematization Approach. System description: The transportation ecosystem is
separated into components which are described using the abstraction of enabling technologies in
order to capture a holistic point-of-view without having to know the implementation details.
Security analysis: Identified common attack categories and possible mitigation strategies.
Stakeholders: The parties involved in maintaining a safe and secure transportation ecosystem.
contexts. The functional dimension captures the similarities among the possible attacks on the same
type of technologies, despite the fact that they could be used under different contexts and thus with
different security impacts. We believe this two-tier approach to look at security issues will allow
one to both generalize those problems based on their similarities, and at the same time not lose the
intricacy and diversity of possible attacks when it comes to the interactions among components in
the overall system.

3.8.2 Component View
Based on the roles they play, the transportation ecosystem can be divided into the following
components.
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3.8.2.1

Vehicle
Vehicles, traditionally the “users” of the transportation infrastructure, now form an integral

part of the transportation ecosystem. The connected infrastructure relies on trajectory data from
vehicles which, in turn, rely on the infrastructure for safety advisory and navigation.

3.8.2.2

Intersection
Transportation infrastructure and vehicles/pedestrians exchange information at the inter-

sections and hence intersections serve as an input/output interface. Infrastructure receives input
from vehicles/pedestrians using detection systems, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication,
video surveillance, toll gantries, etc. Information is conveyed back to vehicles/pedestrians using
traffic lights, dynamic message signs (DMS), infrastructure-to-vehicle communication, and mobile
applications.

3.8.2.3

Roadside Unit (RSU)
RSU hosts devices responsible for safe and efficient operation of the intersection. These

include signal controllers that manage the signal timings, Malfunction Management Unit (MMU)
that ensures safety conditions, and network equipment for communicating with other intersections
and the TMC.

3.8.2.4

Transportation Management Center (TMC)
TMC is a regional hub that serves as the mission control for urban transportation and

highway networks. TMC operators collect real-time data and combine with other operational and
control data in order to monitor roadways, proactively optimize traffic conditions, provide inci-
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dent management, disseminate traveler information, and coordinate with other authorities for daily
traffic, special events, accidents and emergencies.

3.8.2.5

Cloud End-point
Modern systems require heavy computational capabilities and rely on cloud-based infrastruc-

ture to host them. Existing usage of such services include vehicle diagnostics, real-time navigation,
fleet management, and data-driven traffic monitoring services, with more emerging.

3.8.3 Technological View
Each component relies upon one or more technologies to function. In many cases, similar
functionality is required across different components. Hence, based on the function provided, we
group them into different classes of technologies: sensing, control, inference, application, and communication. Examining the transportation ecosystem based on these abstractions of technologies
provides an opportunity to understand common attack patterns across components. This provides
the basis for cybersecurity discussions amongst experts from different domains, that would otherwise be inhibited by technical details involving the differing domains. In addition, contextualization
of those technologies within the transportation ecosystem aids in identifying attack goals, attack
paths, and impacts that would otherwise be overlooked. An example of this is further discussed in
Section 3.9.3.2. We describe each of these technologies below.

3.8.3.1

Sensing
The class of technologies used to detect the surrounding environment are grouped under this

category. This also includes communication-based sensing such as vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
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devices. Sensing technologies facilitates translation of physical world inputs to electrical/digital
signals. Sensing inputs are utilized in various components of the transportation system to improve
efficiency and/or safety. For example, vehicles have hundreds of built-in sensors to facilitate features
such as collision detection, automatic lane keeping, blind-spot detection and more. On the road,
sensors are used for vehicle detection, toll enforcement, monitoring, and others.

3.8.3.2

Control
The class of technologies which facilitates the control functionality directly through operation

of actuators or indirectly by informing end-users to take certain actions. These technologies usually
consists of small computing devices. For example, electronic control units (ECU) in vehicles and
signal controllers in the RSU.

3.8.3.3

Inference
The class of technologies used to extract insights from data collected through both sensing

and communication. Increased use of sensor technologies and connectivity gives rise to vast amounts
of data. Making use of these data points presents a huge challenge on its own. New challenges are
present in utilizing the vast amounts of data for real-time operations such as in autonomous vehicles
and signal timing optimizations using vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications. Real-time
V2I data collection and utilization also presents privacy related challenges.

3.8.3.4

Applications
Mobile, web, and desktop applications used throughout the vehicle transportation ecosystem

are grouped under this category. They allow humans to interface with other technologies. For
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example, end-users use applications to view inferred insights like optimal navigation, and TMC
operators use applications to configure and manage different field devices remotely.

3.8.3.5

Communication
Communication and networking technologies are grouped under this category. Communica-

tion channels between different technologies enable them to work in unison as a single unit. The
connectivity can be within components or across components. Such connectivity can be provided
using different standardized, custom built, or proprietary technologies. Latency, bandwidth, and
reliability requirements dictate the type of communication channel used. For example, vehicles communicate with RSUs using dedicated short range communication (DSRC) while RSUs are connected
to the TMC using optical fiber cables.

3.8.4 Stakeholders Involved
The transportation ecosystem is influenced by a number of stakeholders at various stages,
each with their own responsibilities. We categorize the stakeholders as follows.

1. End-users the public using the roadways and the transportation technologies available to
them.
2. Vendors software and hardware providers for the transportation ecosystem.
3. Operators individuals responsible for daily operation and maintenance of the transportation
system.
4. Regulators regulatory authorities and policy makers.
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3.9

Systematization of Knowledge
We use the systematization framework introduced in Section 3.8 to present the existing

literature uniformly, across the two dimensions discussed above. The transportation infrastructure
is an amalgamation of multiple disciplines and as such the body of research work is also spread
across these different domains. Hence, we do not aim to provide a complete survey and instead
focus on covering the breadth of this field, extracting key aspects (common attack techniques,
proposed mitigations, stakeholders involved) for each dimension. We supplement this with realworld examples from our field experience and online resources where applicable.
The literature review itself was an iterative process with the initial reviews conducted in
tandem with the fieldwork. When we discuss various security issues with the TMC personnel, we
conducted extensive search for relevant articles, both peer-reviewed and otherwise, using search
engines. These articles then further drove the discussions during the fieldwork as it brought forward
relevant research topics that could be discussed within the context of the TMC. Where a large
number of works covering a topic are available, we included those considered to be significant based
on the content, number of citations, and publication venues. For articles that cover an important
aspect in the ecosystem, even such papers are not highly cited or did not appear in highly ranked
venues, we still included them if they provided valuable information. To make it easier for readers
to navigate the selected articles, we provide an online portal to view them within our framework:
https://transportation-sok.github.io/
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3.9.1 Attacks on Sensing
3.9.1.1

Types of Sensing Technologies
Most sensing technologies are used in intersections for vehicle detection:

1. Traditional: Inductive loop, magnetometer, electro-magnet sensors, infrared sensors, microwave radar, etc.
2. Communication-based: ISM band radios (900 MHz / 4.9 GHz / 5.8 GHz), vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication.
3. Video-based: Video cameras with image processing.
These sensing technologies detect vehicles and pedestrians to control signal timing. Data
collected are also aggregated to measure volume, speed, and travel time which are further analyzed,
the insights from which can inform system-wide signal timing performance improvement [109].
Specialized sensors can detect radio waves emitted from transit buses, trains, and emergency vehicles
to give them priority in passing. Automatic vehicle identification systems are used for toll collection,
red light violation, etc. There are also sensors for highway ramp metering, measuring truck weight,
and the increasing trend of sensors for monitoring the surrounding environment such as air quality.
We also consider time synchronization a type of sensing. This is used in roadside unit
(RSU), and could be implemented through microwave links, GPS, or more modern computing
technologies [27]. It is necessary for important tasks such as switching of signal timing plans based
on time-of-day, and coordinating signal timing across multiple intersections along a corridor to
achieve continuous traffic flow [108].
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3.9.1.2

Attack Categories
Regardless of the concrete implementation of these sensing technologies, the goals of the

adversary are: (a) to cause erroneous readings, (b) to disrupt the detection (Denial of service
(DoS)/jamming).
Pre-acquisition attacks occur when adversaries deliberately forge/alter/ introduce data/signals
the sensors rely upon, leading to erroneous readings, malfunction, or jamming. Attacks include capture, replay, delay, signal forgery, flooding, and jamming. Both vehicles and RSU ’s use location
data from GPS, which are vulnerable to pre-acquisition attacks including replay, data spoofing, and
jamming [18, 80, 112] leading to incorrect navigation [54, 83]. Pre-acquisition attacks against vehicle
detection systems can induce both false positive and false negative results. Petit et al. [82] showed
erratic detection by cameras through targeting the exposure control of the camera with bursts of
light. Yan et al. [122] demonstrated missed detections (blinding attacks) in millimeter-ware (MMW)
radars (used in Tesla cars) and video-based detection. For MMW, electromagnetic waves in the same
frequency band as the sensors (76–77 GHz) flood the receiver, whereas video-based, LED and visible
laser light sources flood the camera to blind the sensors. While these works are focused on sensors
on vehicles, similar attacks can be effective for sensors in intersections. For communication-based
detections, adversaries can conduct pre-acquisition attacks through attacking the communication
channel (Section 3.9.5.2). Chen et al. [16] demonstrated such a practical pre-acquisition attack
on a V2I system, the Intelligent Traffic Signal System (I-SIG), by assuming control of the source
vehicle and sending fake trajectory data to the infrastructure. This attack bypassed the security
credential management system (SCMS) [116], [107] of I-SIG by compromising an authenticated data
transmitter (i.e., the vehicle) and fooled the sensor into accepting false data.
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Attack on sensing device occur through direct manipulation of the sensing device with physical or remote access can lead to miscalibration causing erroneous readings, data injection/rejection,
or device damage. The attack on GPS disrupting the signal timing disruption discussed in Section 3.6.2 is an example of this attack category. Such sensor disrupting attacks are also considered
by Monteuuis et al. [69] in their attacker model for connected and automated vehicles (CAVs).
Post-acquisition attacks occur when adversaries exploit the sensed data in-transit as it is
transmitted to other local/remote entities. These attacks are usually facilitated by weaknesses in
the communication channel and/or on the receiving end. Cerrudo [14] found that the access point
that received data from in-pavement wireless vehicle detectors built by Sensys Networks [73] did not
require any authentication, allowing false data injection attacks. Obermaier et al. [76] found that
weak authentication in surveillance cameras allowed the adversaries to impersonate as the camera
to the cloud service and trigger motion detection events, inject forged video streams, or deny the
camera of the cloud service completely (DoS attack). Such attacks on traffic cameras can lead
inference systems to extract incorrect traffic flow data.

3.9.1.3

Impacts of Attacks on Sensing
Attacks on sensing impacts the performance of downstream inference and control technolo-

gies leading to undesirable impact on traffic flow and safety. During our fieldwork we learned that
incorrect sensing data was a concern for the TMC engineers. While the concerns were mostly for
malfunction, deliberate attacks would worsen the situation. As discussed in Section 3.6.1, inaccurate or false pedestrian detections at actuated intersections can cause unwanted ref light stoppages
even when no vehicles or pedestrians are present. Similar missed detections, as in the public complaint report, can lead to expected green phase to be skipped which can cause queuing effect in the
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corresponding lanes and worsen traffic conditions as travel time increases. Pre-acquisition attack
discussed earlier by Yan et al. [122] could also achieve similar effect at intersections with video-based
detection.
Ernst et al. [27], using simulation, evaluate the impact of destabilizing time synchronization
in a six intersection coordinated corridor and find that travel time through the corridor can grow
linearly as time passes, causing significant queuing. The attack on GPS discussed in Section 3.6.2
can lead to this undesired outcome.

3.9.1.4

Possible Mitigations
Pre-acquisition attacks are difficult to identify and prevent as they occur outside the system

boundary. Improving data validation and noise reduction could thwart some of these attacks [121,
124], but may not always be effective. Use of redundant sensing devices or technologies is often
proposed [1, 63], but incurs financial cost for additional devices and computational cost to merge
multiple data sources and may not always be viable.
To mitigate attacks on sensing devices, access to devices need to be hardened using existing
security measures. For instance, the security issues disclosed by Cerrudo [14] were not new to the
security community and were fixable using textbook security measures. This work exposed the
lack of attention to security from vendors and the real world consequence. (1) More than 200,000
vulnerable devices (> $100 million) were deployed throughout many countries; (2) the issue was
not simply solvable by patching since communication was not encrypted, and updates were not
signed, making the patching process itself an attack vector; (3) the only real solution would be
device replacement, complicated by the fact that these devices were buried under pavement and
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meant to operate for decades. It would also require coordination with other agencies that deal with
the pavement, and the resulting costs would be prohibitive.
In summary, sensing drives modern capabilities of the transportation ecosystem, but it also
opens it up to input from untrusted sources. As such, it is the first line of defense. Vendors so
far have largely failed to implement basic security measures and are often shown to be unaware
of threats or neglecting them altogether. Retroactive solutions are not only costly but in some
cases infeasible. Hence, vendors bear the responsibility of designing products with security at the
forefront.

3.9.2 Attacks on Control
3.9.2.1

Types of Control Technologies
The functions performed by control technologies in the transportation infrastructure include:

1. Implementing signal timing: Signal controller
2. Actuating visual interfaces: DMS controller
3. Conflict monitoring: Specialized devices such as Malfunction Management Unit (MMU) or
Cabinet Monitor Unit (CMU). It checks for conflicting greens or violation of minimum red
and yellow times, and when such conditions are detected, turns the intersection into all-way
flashing red.

To perform these functions, control technologies have I/O interfaces to receive data from
sensing (direct or communication-based through V2I receivers), or intermediate devices such as
Serial Interface Unit (SIU) or Bus Interface Unit (BIU) which converts I/O signals to/from 24V
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sources. The computing component is typically a general-purpose computer with standard processor
and Linux-based operating system [7]. The traffic flow directives is then transmitted through the
following means:
1. Visual-based: Traffic signals and dynamic message signs (DMS)
2. Communication-based: Infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V) communication
3. Cloud-based: Devices (embedded in vehicles or carried by humans) receiving directives from
the cloud.

3.9.2.2

Attack Categories
A computing unit accessible through various communication channels provides attractive

targets for adversaries. By launching common cyber attacks, adversaries can gain control of the
system or use it to infiltrate into other parts of the ecosystem. Adversaries can do so through:
1. Direct access: For example, front panel of the device or upload from external storage (data
key or USB sticks);
2. Proximity access: For example, through local communication channels like WiFi using mobile
or desktop applications, or from other devices connected to the local network;
3. Remote access: For example, through the wide area networks or Internet.
The feasibility of attacks through all these levels of access have previously been demonstrated in
vehicles [15, 55], [36, 40, 60].
Attack through direct access represent threats where adversaries require physical access.
Such threats often tend to be dismissed as unrealistic. As such the devices under the “protection” of
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these RSUs are deployed with inadequate security considerations. In reality, such incidents do occur
as the control panels and RSUs use shared standardized locks (Corbin style with #2 keys) with
keys readily available for purchase [27], [98]. As discussed in Section 3.6.2, user authentication and
access control capabilities available in signal controllers are not utilized in practice. Even when used,
Ghena et al. [32] report that default settings are not updated in RSUs. Similarly, Kelarestaghi [52]
report multiple cases of hacked DMS controllers with adversaries successfully altering the message
displayed. These hacks only required layman knowledge with most simply exploiting the use of
default credentials to update the messages displayed [47, 57, 58, 93, 117]. These controllers were
also found to expose a vulnerable service which allowed credentials to be updated without having
to authenticate first.
Attacks against the devices in the signal cabinet with physical access discussed in Section 3.6.2 are examples of this attack category. We demonstrated how the intersection can be
trivially sent to all-way flashing red state, sub-optimal signal timing conditions, and even catastrophic unsafe conditions like flickering all-way green conditions.
Attack through proximity and remote access represent threats where the adversaries do not
require physical access to the devices. Proximity and remote-range exploitations are enabled by
I/O interfaces that expose vulnerabilities such as no/weak authentication in remote access services
(commonly associated with embedded or IoT devices). Ghena et al. [32] and Zhang et al. [125] identify the following issues in RSU devices: (i) weak authentication: default and hardcoded credentials,
and (ii) vulnerable services: exposed ssh, ftp and telnet services, remote login (rlogin), remote task
management service, and debug service using Wind river DeBug protocol (WBD) — all could be
exploited to access to the signal controller devices. Similarly, DMS is reported to expose vulnerable
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services including open telnet ports, publicly accessible web-interfaces, and use of insecure protocols such as Simple Network Management Protocols (SNMP) [47, 57, 58, 93, 117]. As discussed
in Section 3.6.2, we were able to gain root access on Econolite signal controllers as it exposed ssh
service setup with default user name and password. Such attacks are also possible without direct
access when the signal cabinet is quipped with wireless dongles.
With proximity or remote access to the signal controllers possible, we can remotely achieve
unsafe conditions of one second flickering green light without triggering the MMU/CMU as discussed
in Section 3.6.2. Independently, Ning et al. [74] achieved a stronger attack on MMU/CMU by
carefully timing the conflicting greens down to 200ms, which is the transient time required to
trigger a conflict state. This results in a flickering green and solid green on two conflicting routes,
highly likely to lead to severe crashes in the intersection. These results show that remote attacks
can drive intersections into unsafe signal conditions, even with MMU/CMU present as the final line
of defense.

3.9.2.3

Impacts of Attacks on Control
Following impacts are observed through attacks on visual interfaces:

1. Performance and safety degradation: Displaying unsafe/unreliable information on the DMS
regarding route information, real-time traffic conditions, variable speed limits, and weather
conditions can lead to unnecessary traffic diversions or unsafe road conditions.
2. Distractions: Studies have shown that the credibility of DMS is important to achieve efficient
operations as well as ensure safety of workers with automated work zone information systems
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(AWIS) [78, 81], [23]. Even distracting messages can have long-term impact from reduced
trust in and future ignorance of important safety messages.

Following impacts are observed through attacks on signal controllers and conflict monitors:

3. Unsafe conditions: Assumptions regarding safety guarantees through MMU/CMU is jeopardized as discussed above. This can lead to fatal accidents.
4. Inefficient signal timing causes increased delays and further produces environmental and financial consequences with increased emission and fuel consumption [92], [11, 84]. Additionally,
with the increased connectivity, a single compromised network connected device will grant
adversaries access into the transportation ecosystem [74].

3.9.2.4

Possible Mitigations
Physically securing RSUs with separate locks and use of strong authentication mechanisms

in the devices within can harden against direct attacks. However, in practice such measures are
turned down as it leads to operational hindrance for field operators to manage hundreds of keys
and passwords. Use of RFID-based locks [68] might be another solution but requires updating
hundreds of cabinets, a financial burden for municipalities. Apart from that, we also have to
account for extreme cases such as power outage due to unforeseen circumstances in which case
physical keys might be preferred. Mitigation of remote attacks is possible (in theory) simply by
following best practices. Disabling unnecessary vulnerable services, avoiding use of hard-coded
or weak authentication mechanisms, using virtual private network (VPN), and minimizing network
exposure in general should harden the security posture of the transportation infrastructure [32], [47].
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In summary, while control technologies are built on top of well established operating systems
and software, common vulnerabilities, some even trivial, still dominate. Vendors and operators alike
have not adopted available counter measures and instead relied heavily on the previously closed
nature of the transportation infrastructure. Emerging threats are no longer limited to performance
degradation. Safety critical attacks, previously thought to be impossible, have been demonstrated.
Unlike sensing, which tend to be deployed and relied upon for decades without any changes, control
technologies regularly interact with operators. Vendors, operators, and regulators all have a role to
play in mitigating existing issues and improving the security posture.

3.9.3 Inference Technologies
3.9.3.1

Types of Inference Technologies
Inference technologies derive insights from both online real-time data, and offline historical

data, to inform control and provide insights to operators. Telemetry data from dozens of sensors
in vehicles are utilized for fleet management, route optimization, and predictive vehicle diagnostics [17]. Within RSUs, Connected vehicle (CV) based Intelligent Traffic Signal System (I-SIG)
calculates optimal signal timings at intersections in real time based on trajectory data collected
by V2I sensors at the intersections. At TMC s, inference systems aggregate information from multiple sources to produce insights that assist operators in traffic monitoring, incidence response,
and system-wide planning [20], [25, 67, 113]. Data sharing agreements between TMCs, end-users,
and third parties facilitate commercial applications for end-users and operators. Several real-time
traffic signal prediction and advisory applications have been developed such as GreenDrive [126]
and SignalGuru [56]. Mobile applications such as Connected Signals’ Enlighten [19] provides red
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light countdowns and green-wave speed3 advisories to drivers based on inferences from predictive
models [33, 34]. Waycare [113] combines data from multiple sources to provide real-time traffic
monitoring with predictions of future congestion and potential accident risk areas.

3.9.3.2

Attack Categories
Adversaries can attack the various inference technologies to (a) influence the insights ex-

tracted, (b) force real-time prediction to miss deadlines, rendering them useless, or (c) disable the
system altogether. Vulnerabilities can exist in the inference system because of flawed algorithms
and/or flawed implementations. Adversaries can exploit them either through direct attacks, enabled
through vulnerabilities of the host platform on which the inference system runs, or through indirect
attacks, where vulnerabilities in a different component are exploited causing malicious data to flow
into the inference system.
Direct attacks represent threats where adversaries require physical access. The feasibility
of attacks through physical access depends on the location of the host platform. Such attacks can
be limited to insider attacks for TMC/cloud-endpoint components. Host platforms provide core
services such as data ingestion APIs and remote administration to the inference system, all of which
are attack surfaces for adversaries. Similar paradigm is found in the IoT domain, where security
vulnerabilities are found to be exposed through weak authentications, insecure implementation of
APIs, and mis-configurations [6].
Indirect attacks represent threats where adversaries do not require direct physical access.
Adversaries can manipulate input data sources to inference technologies by attacking another component of the transportation ecosystem. These attacks are difficult to consider during the system
3

Speed at which vehicles are likely to encounter continuing green lights in a coordinated corridor.
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Figure 3.4: False Data Injection Attack Against the I-SIG Inference System. The figure shows
I-SIG enabled RSU with additional context information for the vehicle. Arrow shows the data-flow
path from the vehicle to the I-SIG system. In this case, vehicle’s control technology responsible for
sensor data transmission is compromised, allowing malicious data-flow through to otherwise secure
RSU.
design as the input sources are typically out of the designer’s control and often assumed to be
trustworthy. Chen et al. [16] discovered that certain edge-case input data are not handled optimally by the inference system used in Intelligent Traffic Signal System, or I-SIG. Crafted malicious
data can be injected into the system through the pre-acquisition attack discussed in Section 3.9.1.2,
leading to inefficient signal timing to be generated. The attack path can be visualized using our
systematization framework as shown in Figure 3.4. I-SIG is required to ingest untrusted data and
compute optimal signal timing within two seconds. Ideally, data validation/noise reduction mechanisms should be in place to reject malicious input. But with only limited computational power
available, a less optimal algorithm was implemented, introducing this vulnerability.

3.9.3.3

Impacts of Attack on Inference
Based on the use case of inference systems, attacks can have impacts on both performance

and safety. Both performance and safety impacts are higher in real-time systems. The attack on the
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above I-SIG system resulted in 23.4% degradation in travel time of vehicles through the attacked
intersection compared to the base system without it [16]. This is a significant drop in performance,
negating the benefits of the system. Unreliable insights generated from false data injections also
impact the decision making process of the TMC operators and lead to performance and safety
impacts.
The impacts are catastrophic in real-time safety critical applications such as in CV and
self-driving cars. For example, Adbo et al. [1] report that critical information such as vehicle’s lane
position and platoon identification number are not used when merging two platoons, allowing fake
data to initiate merge between two platoons in different lanes to proceed. Hence, use of such data
driven technologies in the vehicle transportation system must consider the possibilities of attacks
on the inference systems through direct or indirect means.

3.9.3.4

Possible Mitigations

1. The inference system should be resilient against malicious inputs. Here trade-offs may have
to be made like in the I-SIG example above. A holistic system evaluation is necessary to
make informed trade-off decisions. Any assumptions made must then be reflected in the
design of the other components of the ecosystem so that necessary security measures can be
implemented. Dedinsky et al. [21] propose a system with video as a redundant data source to
identify false data injections from connected vehicles. But such solutions require fundamental
design changes and do not account for the limited resource constraint and other problems that
may arise, such as, which data source to trust in case of conflicting information.
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2. Secure API endpoints: API design should account for the underlying communication channel
and incorporate appropriate authentication and encryption mechanisms.
3. Secure the underlying host platform: As with control technologies, unnecessary services should
not be exposed, to reduce the attack surface.

In summary, inference systems provide critical insights for control and operator decision
making. Incorrect insights can cause adverse impacts on performance and safety. Threats are
particularly difficult to identify when these systems do not directly interact with external sources.
Suggested mitigations include identifying critical data sources, sanitizing inputs, and augmenting it
with redundant sources where possible.

3.9.4 Applications
3.9.4.1

Types of Applications
Mobile, web, and desktop applications are companions to the other technologies in the

ecosystem. They provide output interfaces for monitoring in the TMC and advisory information
such as speed limits and route planning to end users. They also perform critical tasks such as
relaying information to the cloud, and providing configuration and management capabilities for
sensing, control, and inference.

3.9.4.2

Attack Categories and Impacts
Ease of access to applications makes them attractive targets for adversaries. Security issues

with mobile, web, and desktop applications, and the proper mitigations are well known to the
security community and are not discussed in detail here. Instead, we shed light on the applications
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used in the transportation ecosystem, the threats they pose, and the security considerations they
make (if any) based on our fieldwork and appropriate literature.
Vehicle and intersection components have many end-user applications. For example, navigation applications are widely used by end-users. These relay location data to cloud-based inference
systems which provides opportunities for post-acquisition attacks. Implicit trust in the applications
by cloud counterparts facilitates false data injection attacks which can lead to manipulation of realtime traffic data and sub-optimal routing [50, 91], [100]. With the emergence of CV, applications
have more safety critical utility. For example, Connected signals app [19] displays real-time traffic
light predictions at each intersection. This changes the threat landscape from inconveniences to the
users to potential safety hazards such as traffic violations and accidents.
RSU components also have applications to configure or manage devices, some with additional proximity or remote access capabilities. Ning et al. [74] find that devices implicitly trust the
applications allowing a signal controller’s datakey to be flashed without authentication using an
application developed based on the specifications provided online. Such implicit trust is dangerous and can be used to eavesdrop, leak configuration settings, user credentials, or reverse engineer
communication protocols involved [14, 74].
Applications used in the TMC allow network wide management of signal controllers, DMS,
toll gantries, reversible lanes, and so on. Others provide visibility into the entire system for traffic
monitoring and data analytics to assist daily operations. These are powerful applications, the access
to which can facilitate all the attacks discussed in Section 3.9.2.2 and securing them is paramount.
As discussed in Section 3.6.3, TMC utilize many applications lacking basic security mechanisms
such as use of authentication. Existence of a variety of applications utilizing technologies ranging
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from decades ago such as the Microsoft DOS operating system to modern artificial intelligence based
technologies such as Waycare [113] also presents a challenge to secure the infrastructure in the TMC
as a single weak link can allow attackers into the system.
Monitoring applications include BlueTOAD [99] which utilizes data collected from traveller’s
bluetooth-enabled devices at various intersections. Waze Traffic View [114] and Waycare [113]
utilize crowd sourced and other open data sources. Although these applications have less security
implications, adversarial access can misinform operators which can hide issues or lead to incorrect
decision making.

3.9.4.3

Possible Mitigations
Mitigation for the shortcomings of legacy systems such as MTCS is to simply replace it

with the latest technology. But in practice, this requires both device replacement and fundamental
changes since it requires updating the backbone communication channel from twisted copper pair
to fiber optics, and replacing all the cabinets on heavy traffic roads with the latest ones. This is
not only cost prohibitive, but also requires coordination between several organizations as it would
require construction work on the road, planning from the communication network perspective, and
all the while providing smooth traffic flow through the city. This difficulty of upgrading legacy
systems poses the primary challenge of securing the transportation ecosystem.
Vendors must practice secure software development practices and use vulnerability discovery tools where applicable. Assumption of closed-source nature of the transportation ecosystem for
security is not valid as proven by acquisition of hardware and software artifacts through social engineering [14]. Implementation of appropriate authentication and secure data exchange mechanisms
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with use of encryption and proper handling of cryptographic keys is a must. In addition to the
normal secure application development practices, vendors must evaluate operational requirements
and use cases to identify specific threats, impacts, and usability concerns in the transportation
ecosystem. Different operational constraints in the transportation ecosystem means that the most
prevalent solution might not be the most suitable.
In summary, implicit trust between technologies and companion applications is an enabler
of attacks. These issues are also seen in the IoT domain but the level of risk is considerably more in
the transportation ecosystem as applications can configure and manage the core technologies. The
usability constraints also vary compared to the IoT domain in general as multiple operators require
simultaneous access. Vendors must adhere to the established security principles, while considering
domain specific challenges, to develop secure applications.

3.9.5 Communication Technologies
3.9.5.1

Types of Communication Technologies
In vehicles, multiple sensors and ECUs communicate with varying requirements on timing,

bandwidth, and priority using standardized protocols such as Control Area Network (CAN) as
well as proprietary ones. In RSUs, devices are connected using direct point-to-point connections
such as synchronous data link control (SDLC) serial bus, or local area networks (LAN). National
Transportation Communications for Intelligent Transportation System Protocol (NTCIP) facilitates
communication between multiple TMCs and Advanced Transportation Controllers (ATCs) [75].
With the introduction of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V),
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V) communications are currently
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being tested in the field [29], [103]. Vehicle-to-anything (V2X) communications is being standardized as dedicated short range communication (DSRC) in the U.S. by IEEE [53] and as ITS-G5
in Europe by ETSI [28]. With the proliferation of electric vehicles, roadside charging units have
introduced vehicle-to-grid (V2G) communication through wired power-line-communication (PLC)
which provide complex interactions such as automatic billing [9].

3.9.5.2

Attack Categories
A typical claim for “security” is that the transportation network is air-gapped/isolated from

the Internet. This assumption does not hold. A simple search on the Shodan [88] search engine
reveals many Internet-connected signal controllers. During our fieldwork, we found that thirdparty VPN access to the internal servers is common for maintenance, upgrades, and use of cloud
services. This necessitates complete trust in the third party to maintain the isolation. At the TMC,
workstations connected to the transportation network were in general separate from the personal
workstations connected to the Internet. But in practice some workstations were connected to both
networks for ease of use.
Vendors tend to claim security of products by use of proprietary protocols. Claims of
security through obscurity using proprietary protocols is weak as reverse engineering of protocols is
common [13, 90].
Considering the communication mechanisms and security properties, attacks can be categorized into: (i) attacking weak crypto; and (ii) compromising network nodes.
Weak cryptography represents a major threat to the communication mechanisms. Proprietary protocols developed by vendors often omit security considerations and do not use authen-
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tication and encryption mechanisms. This opens the possibilities for both passive eavesdropping
and active man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks [1, 14]. Cerrudo [14] reports that vendors of wireless
vehicle detectors deliberately chose not to implement authentication and encryption when designing
their protocol, claiming that the proprietary nature of the protocol led to the clients and vendors
deciding against additional security. Researchers were able to capture the traffic within the range of
the IEEE 802.15.4 2.4 GHz transceiver, reverse engineer the protocol, and carry out post-acquisition
false data injection attacks. Additionally, the over-the-air update system was neither encrypted nor
signed, potentially allowing firmware update worms against the system. Even with cryptographic
measures, flaws in the protocol design allow cryptanalysis and replay attacks. Roufa et al. [48]
identify that the static data packet format used in the tire pressure management system (TPMS)
protocol was flawed allowing cryptanalysis and replay attacks. They were able to trigger alerts by
flipping a single bit, and track the vehicles by retrieving vehicle identifiers from the data packets.
Baker et al. [9] find that V2G communication for EV charging use unencrypted communication
channels allowing extraction of personal identifiers through eavesdropping. Such identifiers can be
used for financial gain through payment systems or user tracking. Ghena et al. [32] find that proprietary protocols used for communication between RSUs over the ISM band (5.8 GHz or 900 MHz)
have similar shortcomings of lack of encryption, information leaking data packet formats, and use
of simple transmission schemes such as frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS).
Compromising network nodes is another possibility for adversaries to exploit the communication mechanisms. The transportation industry has taken steps towards incorporating security in
this front. DSRC is not secure by design, but IEEE 1609.2 standard looks to secure the communications by use of public key infrastructures (PKI). Laurendeau et al. [61] and Kreilein [59] note
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that, even with cryptographic measures, DSRC can still be an enabler for attacks to the transportation ecosystem through deception attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks (using false messages for
spoofing or jamming), cryptographic attacks (private keys still accessible through OBD-II ports
in vehicles), malware exploitation (using DSRC as a transmitter), and V2X exploitation (due to
deployment of infrastructure without security architecture). USDOT has also defined a message
security standard, the Secure Certificate Management System (SCMS) which ensures that vehicles
and RSUs have valid certificates during communication [12]. However, a compromised node with
valid certificates can still bypass these security measures [16]. Another major application of V2V
communication is platooning. Adbo et al. [1] find deficiencies in the V2V Platoon Management
Protocol (PMP) and demonstrate that adversaries can cause platoons to merge over large unsafe
distances, slow down through fake obstacle detections, engage unsafe cross-lane merges, and even
takeover a platoon and lead it to dangerous situations.

3.9.5.3

Possible Mitigations
Implementing secure communication protocols is known to be a difficult problem as even the

most widely used protocols like TLS/SSL have previously been found to have vulnerabilities [66].
Standardized protocols should be used whenever possible. Open specifications (vs proprietary) for
protocols allow experts to discover issues and improve them [74]. Hence, when appropriate, vendors
should opt for well established protocols over custom ones. Use of cryptographic measures is always
suggested when custom protocols have to be created. Additional consideration regarding data
packet formats, consistency checks are also necessary to avoid cryptanalysis and other side channel
attacks [48]. Suitable replacements or upgrades to widely used existing vulnerable protocols should
also be considered [64]. Applications involved in communication must also be secured. This includes
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use of up-to-date implementations of cryptographic libraries, and secure storage of cryptographic
keys. Legacy applications should also be patched to use updated protocols and enable encryption.
In summary, a myriad of communication protocols exist in the transportation ecosystem.
For many purposes, the industry has taken steps to develop open standards which facilitate interoperability as well as allow expert to study and validate them. But security is not considered as a
major factor from the beginning and only implemented as an add-on, often with use of TLS/SSL.
Worrisome is that when security is not imposed by the underlying specification or compliance regulations, vendors consistently opt-out of implementing it. Hence, security-aware design must be
adopted and operators and regulators must demand higher security standards from the vendors.

3.10

Discussions
Within the transportation ecosystem, the roadside infrastructure is still in its infancy of

technological advancement. This often means that the impact of cyber vulnerabilities is not as high
yet. However, we are able to identify a number of weaknesses that portend much graver impacts
should the system move quickly into the connected vehicle/autonomous vehicle paradigm, as many
contend is happening. First, there is an over reliance on the isolated nature of the transportation
infrastructure for security. Second, there is a race for rapid development of feature-rich products.
Third, stakeholders leading the development often do not have adequate technology background,
with many vendors evolving from developing mostly electrical systems to modern computer applications and cloud-based services. Lastly, usability always trumps security. In an operational
environment such as the transportation infrastructure where many operators are not “cybersecurity
savvy”, operational convenience is even more emphasized than cybersecurity practices.
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As seen from Section 3.8, the vehicle transportation ecosystem is an intricate one where
different technologies rely on each other to perform their tasks. Hence, the need for security might
not be obvious as identifying attack goals, attack paths, and impacts can be difficult. To answer
“why someone would attack a device?” one needs to not only know what the device does, but how it
interacts with other devices in the ecosystem. Understanding the interactions between devices also
helps identify potential attack paths. This information is not obvious to the developers working
only on a single technology in the transportation ecosystem, as evidenced by the vendor’s decision
to not include authentication and encryption on wireless detectors discussed in Section 3.9.5.2. The
impacts of attacks and incentives to achieve them are also not easily observable. The primary impact
is congestion and, even with the development of a successful exploit, its impact can only be shown
through simulation models, which is not as “eye-catching” as real demonstrations of potential harm
as shown by vehicular hacks. But congestion is a real problem. A study conducted by INRIX in 2019
estimates that drivers spent 99 hours in traffic per year in the U.S., which amounts to an average
cost of $1,377 per driver ($88 billion annual cost) based on the FDOT’s time loss valuation [84].
Until recently, the impact on safety was thought to be limited as conflict monitors were assumed to
protect against conflicting greens by sending the intersection into conflict flash [32]. The flickering
green attacks weakened this major safety assumption [74].

3.10.1 Emerging Threats
The transportation ecosystem is a critical infrastructure and is going through a rapid
technology-driven overhaul. With increasing involvement of technology in mobility of both vehicles
and pedestrians, the impacts of cyber attacks is only rising. Most of the applications being tested
in the three CV pilots in the U.S. are designated as safety features — 12 of 15 in New York [104],
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9 of 13 in Tampa [105], and 5 of 5 in Wyoming [106]. Once these are deployed and relied upon,
cyber attacks will have even bigger safety implications. As we have seen, mitigating issues after
deployment in the transportation system has many barriers — large-scale deployment, difficulty in
access, financial restrictions, and involvement of multiple agencies. Hence, future deployments of
technologies must first be put through a thorough security evaluation.
Security is considered a niche domain that requires expert knowledge and yet deploying a
secure system requires collective effort from everyone involved. From the perspective of a user, it
is the responsibility of the vendors to develop adequate security measures in all technologies. But
to maintain security, users also need to utilize the available security measures. For the vendors,
conducting a thorough security evaluation not only requires technical expertise but also domain
knowledge from multiple disciplines to extensively identify attack goals, attack paths, and potential
impacts. City-wide deployments of transportation infrastructures utilize technologies from multiple
different vendors that have to work in unison. Hence, regulatory bodies also need to step in so that
security standards are maintained by all the vendors involved. We believe that our systematization
approach helps to breakdown the silos of each discipline and get everyone involved in the security
discussion by abstracting away technical details into five core technologies which can then be used
to describe any part of the transportation system. This provides the necessary context required to
identify attack goals, uncover attack paths, and reason about attack impacts. Security experts can
then use this information to flesh out the details in the development phase.
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3.11

Related Work
Ghena et al. [32] partnered with a local transportation agency to conduct a thorough vul-

nerability analysis of the signal controller and associated communication channels. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first such analysis and presents important findings such as remote
manipulation of signal timing. Ning et al. [74] partnered with a local municipality to perform vulnerability analysis for vehicle traffic signal system. They demonstrate an attack that practically
achieves all-way-green state at intersections, breaking the safety assumptions previously thought to
be provided by CMU/MMU. Ernst et al. [27] present a framework for threat assessment of traffic cabinets with four levels of access and evaluate the potential impact using simulation models.
Abdo et al. [1] present a systematic analysis of safety and performance impacts of attacks on CV
platooning protocols. Dominic et al. [22] propose a risk assessment framework suitable for threat
modelling in cooperative automated driving applications. Baker et al. [9] broaden the scope of vehicular transportation ecosystem and investigate EV charging infrastructure and security issues in the
corresponding vehicle-to-grid communication. In comparison to these prior works on transportation
infrastructure security, our unique contribution is creating a systematization framework which encapsulates the transportation ecosystem, and using it to organize/communicate the security issues
in a manner that is at once abstract and context-aware.
Ethnographic fieldwork has been used to study security operations centers (SOC) [94, 96].
Our ethnographic fieldwork in the TMC was inspired by this prior work, but had a different type
of purpose and outcome – using the insights gained during the fieldwork, we formulated a systematization framework for the broader field of transportation system cybersecurity.
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3.12

Conclusion
We present a systematization framework for understanding and communicating cyber se-

curity knowledge in the vehicle transportation ecosystem. The framework views the ecosystem
through two dimensions: components and technologies. This two-tiered view allows us to discuss
security issues that are both common in pattern across multiple components, and intricate and
context-specific due to inter-component interactions. This provides a coherent framework through
which to communicate security risks to the various stake holders, and a useful tool for security
evaluations to derive insights into attack goals, attack paths, and potential impacts.
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Chapter 4: Study 2 — Secure Software Development

4.1

Background
A wide range of research has addressed how to best establish secure development practices

within a software development team/company. The standard approach is to use a secure development model to formulate a suitable secure software development lifecycle (S-SDLC) [31, 46, 123, 133].
Despite the success of S-SDLC in its originating company, successful establishment of secure development practices has remained more difficult for the software industry at large [46]. In general,
some companies are unwilling to place code security on a level playing field with business considerations such as time-to-market of the product. There are also companies who make an effort to
deliver secure code through the adoption of secure development life cycles but have not been able
to do so effectively. Reasons for such failures have been identified as lack of security knowledge
in developers, lack of available resources, lack of usable security, improper use of security APIs,
etc [2, 38, 118, 120]. Use of security tools is often suggested as a way to help alleviate such problems
by catching developer mistakes before they land in the product. However the adoption of security
tools into development itself can remain an issue [119]. Some studies allude to the notion of security
mindset or security culture within the company as the influential factor in driving these secure development practices [8, 44, 131]. But what is a security culture? What are the benefits it provides
and how can a company start to develop such a culture?
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This chapter 4 describes the eight month long ethnographic study of a software development
company which adopted the secure software development lifecycle (S-SDLC) approximately two
months prior to the PO joining the development team. This provided an invaluable opportunity
for the research team to examine whether and how secure development practices can take hold in
a software development team when there is buy-in from the management. The chapter starts by
describing the specifics of the fieldwork setup before moving on to the observations of the company’s
overall software development processes and challenges facing secure development throughout the
fieldwork. The following section discusses the observation and analysis of the positive shift in the
development team’s practices regarding secure development. Finally, we describe and discuss the
role of an interactive learning process in the creation of a set of preferred practices within the
team which defines the “culture” of the team and how this process can be leveraged to give rise to
security-aware developers and start a security culture in a software company.

4.2

Fieldwork Setting
The research team for this work comprised of me, the participant observer (PO), two com-

puter science professors specializing in systems security and programming languages, and a professor
of anthropology.
The fieldwork was conducted at a software development company headquartered in the
United States with offices throughout the world. The researcher was embedded in a development
team responsible for two security-related products developed by the company, referred to as P1
and P2 in this paper. Product P1 provided network access control capabilities. Product P2 was a
cloud-based service for secure remote access. Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the mode
4

This chapter was published in the Seventeenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2021) [101]
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of work varied between work-from-home and on-premise. The company followed local government
guidelines; mandated work-from-home when stay-at-home order was in effect, and provided the
flexibility of either work-from-home or on-premise otherwise. For on-premise work, the company
followed all safety precautions by reorganizing the office setup to socially distance cubicles and
providing masks and hand sanitizers. All meetings were held through video conferencing even when
on premise. The advantages of being on premise were ease of access to the test environment and
ability to start impromptu discussions and meetings when necessary.
The PO spent three days per week at the company for a duration of eight months. The PO
participated in all activities a regular software engineer at the company would, such as sprint planning, scrum meetings, bug fixes, feature design/implementation/testing, and code reviews. Ample
industry experience and a background in security allowed the PO to integrate quickly into the daily
work.

4.2.1 The Development Team
The main participants were five software engineers (SWEs) in the development team, two
network engineers, two support engineers, two sales/customer relations representatives, one quality
assurance engineer (QAE), one graphic designer, and one vice president (VP), who also oversaw the
management of the two products. All SWEs had at least 1.5 years’ experience within the company,
with two having more than five years’ experience. The QAE joined during the fieldwork.

4.2.2 Methodology
The fieldwork data was analyzed by the research team utilizing the general inductive approach described in Section 2. The descriptive anthropological fieldnotes was also supplemented
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with the following data points which enriched the data analysis in order to draw out the major
implications of our observations to secure software development practices:

• Technical notes: For all the security incidents encountered, tracked the process of identification, technical details, and the progress made towards mitigating the issues.
• Relevant artifacts: Code, tickets, internal wiki pages.

4.3

Software Development Processes and Challenges Facing Secure Development
Approximately two months prior to the researcher joining the development team, manage-

ment instructed the team to employ secure software development lifecycle (S-SDLC). This provided
an invaluable opportunity for the research team to examine whether and how secure development
practices can take hold in a software development team when there is buy-in from the top. In
this section, we describe our observations of the company’s overall software development processes
and challenges facing secure development throughout our fieldwork. In Section 4.4 we focus our
discussion on observations and analysis of the shift in the development processes as a result of the
management push for S-SDLC.
The company adopted a sprint-based agile development model. An issue-tracking tool was
used for planning and tracking the development progress throughout a sprint. We describe this
process below.

4.3.1 Sprint Planning
Everyone in the team was free to create a ticket for any work that was not already tracked
and would be added to the backlog queue. However, only the lead SWEs could approve the ticket

60

for development. In addition, the VP and customer facing specialists could add feature tickets
based on company vision and customer requests/feedback. Each week the VP and the lead sales
representative, along with the lead SWEs had a prioritization meeting where the new tickets were
discussed, approved/rejected for future development, with the approved tickets ranked based on
priority. For each sprint, the SWEs and QAE conducted a sprint planning meeting where the
highest priority tickets from the backlog were discussed and assigned story points representing the
estimated complexity/amount of work. Story points for each ticket were agreed upon by the whole
team using SCRUM poker [137], where each SWE and QAE anonymously assigned story points
based on their understanding of the required work. When the assigned scores varied widely, a
discussion was held to allow each SWE/QAE to explain the reasoning for their scores and SCRUM
poker was re-done, until everyone converged on a common score. A total of 60–70 story points
were targeted for each sprint, which allowed for a small number of additional high-priority tickets
or unforeseen issues to be included in the sprint at a later time.

4.3.2 Development Workflow
A short 20–30 minute scrum meeting was held every morning to provide brief updates on the
progress from the previous day, any issues/roadblocks encountered, and goals for the current day.
The meeting was led by the lead SWE and included all SWEs, the QAE, the graphic designer, and
the VP. Additional meetings were called by individuals as required to discuss ticket requirements,
design issues, knowledge transfer for codebase, or testing strategies. We next discuss the stages of
development and the challenges facing secure development in the context of each stage.

61

4.3.2.1

Design
A high-level design discussion was held during the sprint planning. For simple tickets, the

SWE assigned took the responsibility of finalizing the design. For more complex tickets, discussions
were held with the appropriate team members. In some cases, a wiki page with suggested alternatives
was requested before such discussions.
Including security as a part of the design consideration presented the following challenges.

• Challenges regarding security knowledge of SWEs: During the design stage the main focus
was to achieve functional correctness and performance considerations when applicable. When
the features dealt with sensitive information, security became a necessity. Yet, secure design
practices were not always the focus and instead assumed protection through “security functions” such as authentication and authorization. For example, one SWE when asked if the
input attributes should be validated:

“I’m not sure I’d worry too much about that. This form is authorized for admin
only, so customers won’t be changing this attribute themselves. Trying to validate
that they’ve provided a valid <redacted> attribute feels kind of complicated. . . ”
Secure design must determine relevant threats (through threat modeling) and consider all
aspects of the software, but it is a tall order to require all SWEs to have such knowledge and
skills.
• Challenges in understanding contextual knowledge by a security expert: One of the software
engineers in the team had a significant background in security (called SecSWE hereafter). He
was able to identify the relevant security risks and propose secure design solutions. However,
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although he had been working with the team for more than 1.5 years, the knowledge of the
minutiae of how the product operated was lacking and the proposed solutions were not always
directly applicable for the product at hand. Since there was no one-size-fits-all solution to
security problems, secure design required in-depth knowledge of both security and the product.

4.3.2.2

Implementation
SWEs picked up tickets from the sprint plan to implement. Again, the first priority of

SWEs was to implement the functional requirements of the tickets. We observed the following
secure development challenges in this stage.

• Challenges regarding security knowledge in SWEs: Even with security considerations in the
design phase, the actual implementation of code could expose vulnerabilities if the SWE was
not capable of defensive programming and unaware of secure development practices. The
main challenge is that the SWE needs to be able to identify the potential security risks in
the code that he/she is writing. Other factors such as reliance on frameworks, or incorrect
use of frameworks or APIs can also lead to insecure implementation. Such lack of knowledge
in SWEs cannot be simply compensated by the presence of a security expert in the team.
Usually in such cases the identification of security issues shifts further down the development
process during code analysis or security testing and presents additional challenges — the issue
might be missed altogether, fixing the security could require significant code changes or even
design changes, or there might not be enough time in the sprint to fix the issues which might
lead to the ticket being excluded from the sprint.
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• Challenges in applying security knowledge in practice: In certain cases SWEs were able to
identify potential security risks and also had the necessary knowledge to resolve them, but
chose not to do so. We concluded this based on our data where we observed that during discussions regarding security issues, often times some SWEs were able to propose the solutions,
but did not apply them in practice. This could be attributed to multiple reasons such as lack
of time, reliance on security functions (such as authentication and authorization), or security
of code considered “invisible” to the customer compared to the feature itself.

4.3.2.3

Continuous Integrations/Code Analysis
Once the implementation was complete, the source code was pushed to the remote reposi-

tory where automated builds were carried out by the continuous integration (CI) pipelines. These
pipelines executed unit/integration tests and code analysis tools such as SonarQube [134] (later
Black Duck [135]) on the feature branch.

• Challenges on fully utilizing available tools: We found that the available tools were not utilized
to their full capabilities. SonarQube was not maintained and mostly only relied upon for
simply lint and code quality checks. The team was asked to set up Black Duck, a tool that
analyzes the use of third-party open-source libraries in the codebase and provides information
on licenses and known security vulnerabilities, into the CI pipeline as a part of the secure
development effort. During discussions on the initial results of the scan, one SWE remarked:
“We use quite a few out-dated packages. I would be surprised if this tool didn’t report any
issues.” Black Duck was setup on management’s request, and the scans were initially enabled
by default in the CI pipeline. But the resulting build failures in the Black Duck stage prevented
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SWEs from merging in code. The tool was then disabled by default and a separate ticket was
filed to track and address the vulnerabilities discovered.

4.3.2.4

Developer Testing
Before a ticket was assigned for code review, SWEs made sure that all automated tests were

passing, deployed the updated product on a test environment, and performed their own testing.
These tests were usually targeted towards functionality rather than security. Once functionality
was verified, the ticket was updated with the steps to replicate the test plan and assigned for code
review with the creation of a pull request.

4.3.2.5

Code Review
Two SWEs were assigned for code review. Usually one SWE provided thorough review

while the other would just sanity-check the code. Depending on the complexity of the feature,
the reviewers may perform quick functionality tests on top of going through the code changes.
Any missing pieces, mistakes, inconsistency or departure from existing best practices in the coding
pattern were set up as tasks to be addressed before the ticket was marked as “done.” We observed
the following challenges in this stage.

• Challenges in consistently performing code review: Occasionally, when the changes were required urgently, code review was essentially skipped with the SWE just describing the changes
made to others and asking if anyone objected to the approach. This could lead to potentially
identifiable issues propagating to the production code base.
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• Challenges in thoroughly performing security review: Although SWEs provided good feedback
during code review, the suggested changes were based on internal best practices and patterns
followed in other similar modules in the product. However, a thorough security code review
requires more in-depth security knowledge and experience which was lacking in the SWEs.
SecSWE however was able to provide specific security-related feedback. A potential API
misuse of a crypto-library (bouncycastle [136]) was identified by SecSWE during code review.
While addressing this comment, it was discovered that the API misuse could have caused
memory leaks leading to out of memory conditions.

4.3.2.6

Post Development Testing
The QAE, who was hired during our fieldwork, prepared thorough test plans for each ticket

in the sprint and carried them out on the test build. We observed the following challenges at this
stage.

• Challenges in acquiring contextual knowledge by QAE: Although the QAE had years of prior
experience, he was new to the team and the products, and hence required assistance to set
up test environments and understand the specifics of the product before he could create
strategic test plans. The QAE also had a security background and showed interest to learn
and practice security-oriented testing along with SecSWE. But he expressed lack of time and
in-depth knowledge about the product as reasons not to do so at that time.
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4.3.3 Product Release
At the end of a sprint, a build of the product including all implementations in the sprint
was deployed within the company for up to a week; then release notes were written and the product
was released. The customers were required to opt-in for the updates, after which the support team
executed the remote update procedures.

4.4

A Shift in Secure Development Practice
Shortly after the researcher joined, one SWE from each product team was assigned to be

a member of a “virtual” application security engineering team and tasked to help drive security
improvements for the product. This was part of the secure software development lifecycle (S-SDLC)
effort that was kicked off before we joined. The designated SWE performed security-related tasks
in addition to the normal sprint work. SecSWE was assigned this role for his team.

4.4.1 Little Impact at First
During the first three months of the fieldwork, the only security-related work fell into two
new categories of tickets created as part of the S-SDLC efforts.

• CSF tickets: security-related tasks guided by the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) [127].
• ASVS tickets: compliance with OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)
framework [129], for web facing application components. Level-1 of the framework requires
that web applications do not expose any easily discoverable vulnerabilities included in the
OWASP top ten [128] or other similar lists.
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These tickets were not included in the sprint plan. SecSWE and another developer (SWE1)
were tasked to work on these tickets alongside the sprint work. Both SecSWE and SWE1 worked
on these tickets individually, and the only updates about this work was provided briefly during
morning scrum. These tickets were referred to as “burning cycles” and often the updates on these
efforts carried little information:

• “I completed another CSF yesterday.”
• “I knocked off a couple of CSF tickets.”
• “I talked with <management personnel> about some CSF work and what is expected.”
• “I will be catching up on some neglected CSF work and write up some wikis.”
• “Maybe I will pick up some CSF stuff in my spare time.”
• “My changes are in PR. I will next work on ASVS tickets while I wait for reviews.”
• “I am working on a P2 ticket and also doing some ASVS audits.”
• “I finished 4 or 5 ASVS tickets.”
• “I have a lot of ASVS work to do.”

When talking to SecSWE on how the security work is going, he remarked:

“I don’t know. It takes a lot of work for this ASVS stuff, looking at all the code, testing,
researching. . . I feel like we are putting all of this effort and time on this but nothing is
being done about it you know.”
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Although significant effort was put on resolving the CSF and ASVS tickets, we did not
observe any impact on the development workflow as a whole.

4.4.2 Making Progress
During the third month of the fieldwork, SecSWE started to work on threat models for
both products. In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the product architectures, a meeting
was requested with the lead SWEs. However, as P2 was pending a major release during this time,
the meeting was postponed for after the release and SecSWE was asked to focus on P1 till then.
Nonetheless, he first shared the initial threat model for P1 with the team for feedback which garnered
greater visibility on the security work in the development team as a whole and initiated discussions
on the communication patterns between the different microservices in the product. SecSWE also
documented the security issues in a wiki page in in order to facilitate the pending discussions for
the threat modeling work.
Prior to the threat modeling work, two security tickets had also been logged: (1) The
PO discovered that the same key pair was reused for all customers when P1 was setup as a high
availability (HA) pair. (2) On further investigation, SecSWE discovered another instance of key
reuse problem in establishing connections to the cloud server. The threat modeling work also
initiated discussions and feedback from other SWEs concerning these issues.
Another key mismanagement issue was discovered where a private key was exposed in a
publicly accessible server. A wiki was created detailing the potential misuse cases of this error. The
initial response from other SWEs was that this server, while Internet facing, was not advertised
to the public as it was mainly used to distribute software updates. Discussions on the potential
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misuse cases of this issue in particular garnered positive interest in security work with the lead SWE
remarking:

“I am excited about the work SecSWE is doing.”

4.4.2.1

Security Scrum Poker
With several security tickets logged, SecSWE suggested to have a meeting specifically to

discuss these tickets before the next sprint. Prior to the meeting, everyone was asked to review
the tickets and corresponding wiki pages for discussion. SecSWE also introduced the DREAD risk
assessment scheme [65] and the security scrum poker (akin to scrum poker) in order to assess the
estimated risk of the discovered vulnerabilities. The goal was for the entire team to converge on
a risk score for each ticket, discuss the rationale behind the scores in case of mismatch to clarify
everyone’s understanding of the issue, and ultimately use the risk scores to prioritize the security
tickets.

4.4.2.2

Putting Security into Development Context
Three security scrum pokers were held during the fieldwork. In the first meeting, two SWEs

tended to score lower than the others. As with scrum poker, in case of mismatch the SWEs were
asked to explain the rationale behind their scores. This brought forward any misunderstanding
of the discussed issue and allowed the group to clarify them. After a couple of iterations, one of
the SWEs kept having varying scores and tried to move on to another ticket by agreeing with the
others’ scores but the lead SWE remarked: “You cannot just do that. Either you have to defend the
score or tell us why you changed your mind.” The whole team agreed that the meeting was very
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fruitful in clarifying their understanding of the issues and/or the proposed solutions with the SWEs
remarking:

• “That was more productive than I expected.”
• “I really liked this session and the discussions cleared things up. I am excited to see where this
effort leads.”

These discussions led to contextual analysis of the discovered issues (what is the risk in
the system?). They helped uncover root causes of existing issues and bring forward discussion
on potential solutions, trade-offs for alternatives, and potential road-blocks in implementing them.
Importantly, these discussions were useful to SecSWE as well.
The discussions between SecSWE and the lead SWE led to the understanding of how and
why the private key ended up in the public-facing server in the first place — it turned out that
previously P1 was distributed to the customers using Preboot Execution Environment (PXE) boot
over the network. Although this method had not been used for several years, it was still used
internally to quickly deploy test environments. As setting up internal test environments did not
require the PXE boot kickstarter script to be on a public facing server, it was subsequently moved
to an internal server during the fieldwork. This task required collaboration between SecSWE, lead
SWEs, as well as the networking engineers to implement, test, and deploy. For the cases of reused
keys, short-term solutions of limiting users to only required commands while restricting shell access
altogether were proposed. A longer-term goal to set up a per-deployment key management and
distribution mechanism was also discussed. During the fieldwork only the task to research the
approach was created.
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After the first security scrum poker, SecSWE asked others to also report any security issues
they found. During the course of the fieldwork 15 security tickets were created that were not related
to ASVS or CSF. The following are the categories of vulnerabilities discovered during the fieldwork.

• Mismanagement of cryptographic keys and certificates.
• Lack of access control to remote assets
• Improper handling of passwords
• Unencrypted application update channel
• Remote code execution (RCE)
• Cross-site scripting (XSS)
• Privilege escalation
• Hard-coded credentials
• SQL and command injection
• Mis-configured SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) authentication

These issues were discussed in at least one security scrum poker meeting. SecSWE and
the PO also developed proof-of-concept (PoC) attacks for application-level vulnerabilities such as
remote code execution, XSS, Privilege escalation, and SQL and command injection which helped
drive further discussions. Out of the 15 security tickets identified, 8 were approved for development
after going through both the security scrum poker and the prioritization stages. Six of the approved
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tickets were included in a sprint plan. The researcher asked for SecSWE’s opinion on the increased
focus on security. The response was:

“I am surprised by the increased focus on security as well. They were not at all interested
in these stuff before. . . I had already reported some of these issues before, although I didn’t
have time to make PoCs for it. But it’s good that we have some attention now.”

4.4.3 Challenges in Security Ticket Prioritization
Although work was done to identify security issues, getting them prioritized for development
still presented challenges.

• Security tickets were not considered “real”: Purely addressing existing security issues or improving security in existing code/infrastructure was not considered as “real.” In one sprint
planning meeting after a few security tickets were discussed and included in the sprint, the
lead SWE remarked: “Okay now let’s include some real tickets in here as well.” The basis for
this point of view seemed to be that security improvements made to existing features or to
the infrastructure were not visible to the customers.
• Security tickets had higher story points: Many security tickets were voted to have high story
points and hence would not leave room to include other feature-driven tickets. The reasons
for higher scores include:
– Technical challenges: Security tickets required more research and experimentation to
figure out the most suitable solution for the product.
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– Dependencies: Fixing existing security issues required identifying all use cases of the
vulnerable feature and the impacts of the changes on the product. Finding dependencies
itself was time consuming as documentations may be outdated, and additional developer
and QAE testing would be needed.
– Implied changes in processes: SWE/support/QAE may be relying on the vulnerable
features and may not want to change. SWE may need to provide viable alternatives.
“Before we move on with the fix, we need to first find out if there are undocumented
use cases of these things. This is not uncommon with the support team to have some
automated scripts which might rely on some access or some feature and we do not want
to break them.” This could lead to additional work.
• Legacy systems: Older systems already deployed at customer sites may still need to be supported. In such cases, alternative solutions needed to be provided or both new and old systems
needed to be supported. Some security holes may be impossible to resolve because of initial
bad design. One ticket was blocked due to this very reason as around 20 customer sites were
yet to be migrated to the updated system.
• Meeting Customer Requirements: Customers were unwilling to allow change of existing features. During a discussion for changing the rule specification UI, which introduced command
injection vulnerability, one SWE mentioned that they had already tried to remove that feature
before as the product already had an updated alternative built in. But the customers were
unwilling to migrate to the new feature as it meant that they had to transition all the existing
rules to the new format and they were unwilling to do so. SWE said that he already knew
what this customer would say:
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“If there are security issues then that is your problem and you need to fix it without
taking away my features.”
• New customer requests: During the course of a sprint, new high-priority customer tickets may
be received. In such cases the security tickets would be de-prioritized, as happened to two
security tickets included in the sprint plan.

4.4.4 Security-aware SWEs
After the introduction of security scrum pokers, there was an increase in security-related
discussions outside the meetings as well. These ranged from humorous comments — “SecSWE is not
going to be happy if you do that.” or “He is the security police now!? <laughs>” to positive reactions
for including security tickets during prioritization meetings: “SecSWE and <the researcher> are
pretty good with security.”

• Security considerations in other tickets: In addition to the security tickets, security considerations were made in three other feature tickets.
1. User-side error reporting for failed certification validation. The researcher was assigned
this ticket to which led to a major refactoring of the code and use of an updated single
library for performing uniform certificate validation throughout P1.
2. Enabling use of new certificate for SAML authentication without requiring application
restart. A certificate reuse misconfiguration was discovered while working on this ticket.
Code was refactored to allow proper configuration changes as well as utilize the refactored
certificate validation library.
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3. Sending real-time alerts to customers. This ticket required enabling communication between the on-premise customer deployment and the cloud server. This opportunity was
used to improve the access control on the cloud server by allowing access to only the
required commands and disabling shell access altogether.
• Potential security issues identified: Security issues were also brought up and discussed by
other SWEs.
1. An SWE discussed potential XSS vulnerabilities in another team’s application while
working with them, and advocated for the other team to consider upgrading a programming framework to the latest stable version.
2. Input validation was added in multiple modules proactively by SWEs working on a ticket
with UI changes. Often they asked (in person or over Slack [132]) if validation code was
already implemented in the module or where to look for reference validation code. In
cases where validation was complicated like in the P1 lead SWEs proposed how the
validation could be done.

“Do we have any input validation code that is used both by <microservice1> and
<microservice2>? If so, do you remember where it is located?”
“. . . I know that it’s not a priority for management to validate input that is supposed
to be entered only by support, but it doesn’t cost much.”
• Security considerations in design: A feature requested by a high-priority customer required
the ability to access internal configuration options otherwise hidden behind the application for
an unorthodox use case of product P1. The initial design for the feature had not considered
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security risks with the assumption that this feature would only be accessible by the administrative account, which belongs to the support team. SecSWE pointed out that such design could
potentially expose command injection and privilege escalation vulnerabilities and started a
discussion on the feature, which led to the finding that the original design had overestimated
the access requirements to implement the desired functionality. The initial design was then
shelved with a follow up design discussion scheduled to allow time to gather information for
a more secure approach.

4.4.4.1

What Was Driving the Change
On analysis of the fieldnote data, we find that the positive shift in the development team’s

security awareness can be attributed to the software engineers being able to identify the applicability
of the security knowledge within the context of the everyday work they performed. We observe that
by working along with others in the team to apply security knowledge under the concrete context
of the software products, the software engineers became attentive to security risks when similar
situations were encountered later. When a considerable number of discussions had taken place on a
security-related topic, the group ended up with an agreed-upon set of knowledge and the associated
set of practices became the “preferred practice” for dealing with this security concern. At this stage,
considering this specific aspect of code security became the group’s “habit.” Later if some SWE in
the team needed to work on a relevant part of the code but lacked this specific piece of security
knowledge, they would seek guidance from others in the team, in the same manner as they would
with other types of development tasks. They then learned and executed the preferred practice of
the group.
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Our analysis of data shows that what was driving the positive change was the learning
dynamics existent in the development team. The initial lack of visible impact from management
pushing for adopting S-SDLC was because the CSF and ASVS tickets were detached from the
SWEs’ regular work, and thus the relevant security knowledge did not have much opportunity to
be directly applied in their work. It turned out that application of knowledge was the key driver for
learning in an environment like a development team. Later on when SecSWE started to use security
scrum poker in the threat modeling work, and involved all SWEs in the discussions, the security
knowledge became concretized and contextualized. This drove a learning cycle within the team that
allowed the SWEs to start obtaining relevant security knowledge and become more security aware.
We find that understanding the learning dynamics in the development team is crucial to
effectively push for secure development practices. In fact, making developers more security aware
is no different than cultivating their knowledge in any other aspect of software development. Our
data indicate that, to establish a security culture in a development team, it might be helpful to follow
the same learning dynamics that drive how culture forms for that community.

4.5

Learning in a Development Team
The analysis of our fieldnote data yielded a model that explains the establishment and

evolution of preferred practices in a development team and hence the progression of its culture.
In summary, the development team is a situated learning [62] environment where the process of
learning drives the creation and evolution of preferred practices. When SWEs needed assistance,
they acquired the necessary knowledge from the team. As they performed their task and applied
the knowledge in practice, it provided the necessary platform to further drive the process of learning
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and started to make contributions to the group. This process iterated over many cycles, until the
group reached a point of saturation where the knowledge developed within the team was sufficient
to facilitate progression in the task at hand. When this process was applied in practice, it not only
led to professional growth of the SWE but also served as validation for the knowledge which then
became a part of the current culture of practice.

4.5.1 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
As is common in software industry these days, the products the company built were vast
entities and no single SWE knew the details of all aspects of a product. Multiple dimensions of
knowledge were required within the development team in order to build the software, and the indepth knowledge of each dimension was scattered between different SWEs in the team. An SWE
can be the subject matter expert (SME) for some dimensions while at the same time being a novice
in others.
When an SWE had the most in-depth knowledge on a topic within a development team,
they were often called a subject matter expert (SME) of that particular dimension of knowledge.
Although everyone in the team may have a good understanding on the topic, the SME was the one
who understood the underlying details of the implementation. When an SWE started to work on
a task new to them, they first went (or were directed to go) to the SME on the team. This created
an implicit hierarchy within the team based on the dimension of knowledge under consideration,
which facilitated the flow of knowledge within the team. This hierarchy transcended job titles. For
example, despite holding a junior position in the company, a new hire who had worked on a task
could immediately become the SME on certain pieces of knowledge associated with the task, and
any future queries related to these pieces would first be directed towards them.
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We observe the existence of SMEs throughout our data. When trying to set up a test environment for a new router device, an SWE asked the group: “I have read through the documentation
but I still cannot get it to work in our test environment. Can anyone help me out?” He was directed
to one of the network engineers: “Normally, I just go and ask <network engineer>. I do that even
before going through the documentation. 99% of the time, he knows what to do and I trust him.”
When trying to get access to a development infrastructure, the researcher asked the lead
SWE: “I need to access the CA server to test this feature. How do I get access?” Lead SWE: “You
should go ask SWE1. He just cleaned up the access list for the CSF thing.”
When the lead SWE was asked the details of an existing script: “Full disclosure, I have no
idea how that script works. <Former employee> implemented it and no one has had to make changes
till now. But <support engineer> should provide you more information. They are the ones who use
it.” In this case, although the SME is no longer within the company, the workflow established
through the use of the automation script still remained and the next most knowledgeable person
took responsibility of it.
Our data shows that the roles of SMEs, the knowledge on each dimension, and the preferred
set of practices were not static but were developed and evolved within the development environment.
When there were multiple potential SMEs on a topic, the responsibility could be passed on to the
others as well. In some cases this also led to more official transfers of duties within the team.
For example, when dealing with customer issues, the lead SWE was pulled into multiple meetings
between the customer support team and the clients. Overwhelmed by the work, the team internally
discussed the possibility of having another SWE who was working on the problem module for the
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past months to take over some of the client discussions, with some guidance from the lead SWE.
After reaching an agreement, this was then communicated to the management for future meetings.

4.5.2 Establishment of Preferred Practices
The development team tended to have established preferences for activities that were carried
out repeatedly. We observed team preferences for coding styles, debugging techniques, code reviews,
ways of dealing with the IT department, use of scripts/tools for tasks, etc. We also observe that
these preferred practices were usually tried and tested approaches of doing things within the team
and were communicated to other SWEs in the team as needed. For example, preferred coding styles
were communicated through the code itself while any unwarranted deviations were communicated
through code reviews and reverted back to the preferred way. Any changes made to improve the
existing style were also communicated through code and code review. Other preferences could be
communicated mainly through discussions between the SWEs whether in a one-on-one or group
setting. Usually an SWE sought help from the group using language like “Got a second for a
rubber ducky?”, “Can I borrow some of your time <SWE>?” SWEs were encouraged to hold these
discussions in the group chat as there could be more “eyes” on the problem and the solutions could
be reached more quickly. These discussions also allowed for the preferred practices to evolve and
improve as issues or better options were identified.
These preferred practices became a part of the group knowledge and tended to stick through
generations of employees. In such cases some of the in-depth knowledge might be lost with the
employee leaving but the preferred practices continued.

• “That is a script that <former employee> developed and we still use it.”
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• “That playbook was written by a <former employee>. I know what it does but I am not sure
if it uses this script internally. I would have to go read through the code but it gets the job
done.”

4.5.3 A Situated Learning Environment
Through analysis of the field notes we find that the roles of “SME” and “learner”, assumed
by different SWEs for different dimensions of knowledge, drove a learning cycle within the team.
This interactive activity of learning was the core process through which preferred practices were
established within the team.
The pattern of learning observed here is not new. The concept of learning, not through a
teacher/learner dyad, but as a situated activity where a learner not only acquires knowledge from
the experts (“old-timers”) and their peers but does so while participating and contributing in a
community of practice is referred to as situated learning [62, 85, 115]. Learning, in this view, is not
simply a process of transfer or assimilation of knowledge from the expert (SME) to learners (SWEs),
but rather a generative process where each “reproduction cycle” from “learner” to “old-timer” leaves a
trace in the community of practice, in both its social structure and physical, linguistic and symbolic
artifacts.
The development team is a dynamic situated learning environment with a wide range of
knowledge to be acquired and mastered. Based on the dimensions of knowledge under consideration, SWEs simultaneously perform multiple roles of learning practitioner, aspiring expert, status
subordinate, or sole responsible agent [62]. The everyday activity of software development provided
situated opportunities to learn, defining the “learning curriculum” for the task that SWEs were
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performing. As an SWE sought to learn from the team, different SWEs enacted different roles to
drive a learning cycle to reproduce the existing culture of practice.

• “Are you guys available for a zoom to discuss the DNS cache changes for the data viz stuff ?”
• “Alright type gurus. I’m trying to make an interface that is a Map between two sets of constants.
I’m not allowed to do what I posted above. Suggestions? . . . ”

Contradictions also arise as a part of this interactive social process as learners start to
contribute. Working on resolutions to these contradictions leads to a renewed practice in the
community, i.e., preferred practices are established and evolved as SWEs go through the learning
cycle.
In this vein, creating a secure development culture is the process of making secure coding
practices into the preferred practices of the development team. Thus, facilitating situated learning
regarding security within the development team, is key.

4.5.4 The Learning Cycle
Figure 4.1 shows the interactions of an SWE with the development team as he/she progressed
from the role of a learner to an SME. At any given time, an SWE could assume different roles for
different dimensions of knowledge. For example, the SecSWE could be an SME on certain secure
coding practices, but at the same time a learner on some technical details about a particular aspect
of the product. External resources were accessible at anytime throughout the process of learning.
We first describe the different roles an SWE could assume in this learning cycle.
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Development team as a Community of Practice
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Figure 4.1: The Learning Cycle
• Learner : An SWE started out as a learner acquiring knowledge, the preferred set of practices,
from the team. Learners also looked to external resources on their own, especially for a
completely new aspect on which there was no existing knowledge in the team yet. Such
acquisition of knowledge only made a difference in the team’s practice when the SWE applied
the knowledge in the practice, whereby he/she started to contribute to the team’s knowledge
and progressed in the path of professional growth.
• Knowledgeable SWE : The application of acquired knowledge in the context of daily practice by
the SWE served an important purpose — it provided the basis to have contextual discussions
whereby the SWE was able to make contributions to the group. The resulting iterations of
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the interactive learning process led to a convergence in understanding of the knowledge within
the group, and thereby the establishment of preferred practices.
• SME : When the learning cycle reached saturation and no new contributions were made to the
community of practice, the SWE was able to assume the role of SME. In terms of legitimate
peripheral participation [62], the SWE had reached full participation for that particular dimension of knowledge space. The learning cycle then continued for that dimension with other
SWEs filling in the role of learner and knowledgeable SWE.

We find that an effective learning cycle went through the following stages to create, maintain,
and grow the preferred practices through multiple generations of employees.

1. Acquisition: The most accessible and credible source for a learner was the SME on the topic of
interest. They provided access to the current culture of practice to the new learner. The level
of knowledge available in the team varied depending on factors such as education, prior experience, applicability in the daily work, and so on. When the knowledge within the team was
sufficient, the learning cycle simply reinforced the current preferred practices, as new learners
continued buying into it. In case of insufficient expertise within the team, a new knowledge
requirement was created which led to individual/group research on the topic through external
resources. This could also be facilitated by a new member joining the team who possessed the
lacking knowledge.
• Security Implication: the expertise levels of the SMEs on security within the team determine the team’s preferred practice in secure coding.
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2. Application: Acquired knowledge needed to be applied in daily practice to drive the learning
process. This was a critical step in the learning cycle; without application in daily work,
the knowledge was limited to the individual SWE and never became a part of the preferred
practice. On the other hand, applicability led to both individual and team growth as the
applied knowledge was immediately shared to the peers through development activities like
scrum meetings, design/implementation discussions, code review, testing, documentation, and
so on. This provided two important driving forces that helped propagate the learning cycle:
(1) a shared motivation to solve problems, and (2) the shared context of the work practices
which everyone was aware of. These facilitated bi-directional discussions as opposed to a
teacher-student scenario as is often perceived as how transfer of knowledge happens.
• Security Implication: SWEs’ security knowledge, like all other knowledge, needs to be
grown with application. This works well for security, since the best time to apply security
knowledge is when the code is being written (as opposed to applying security knowledge
to fix vulnerabilities later on).
3. Contributions: As SWEs put knowledge into practice, they were able to contribute to the
group based on their experience and findings from daily practice. This knowledge exchange
through application led to the growth and evolution of the whole team with the increase
in existing knowledge on the topic. When there was an established/preferred/agreed upon
knowledge base on that given topic, the knowledge in the group reached a level of saturation,
and it became a part of the preferred practices.
• Security Implication: When security becomes part of the preferred practice, all SWEs
in the team will be security aware while writing new code. We observe that the first
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successful step towards implementing an effective S-SDLC and creating a security culture
in the development team was the rise of security-aware SWEs. After all, if the SWEs are
capable of writing secure code, it will make a real change in the final products’ security.
As was pointed out in prior literatures, fixing security bugs retroactively is costly and
often encounters resistance from the development team [45, 79]. Companies would be
better off to prevent, as much as possible, security vulnerabilities from being introduced
in the first place.

4.6

Revisiting the Shift towards Security
We now identify the key enablers of the positive shift in secure development we observed

during the fieldwork.

4.6.1 Setting Security as a Goal
Past experience suggested that management support was an important factor in the successful implementation of S-SDLC [46]. Our observations supported this. Due to cost in terms of
time and efforts required, security was easily perceived as an “obstruction” to the daily practice of
SWEs and hence the learning cycle for this dimension of knowledge did not evolve at first. We
found that management played an important role to set security as a goal, making it a part of the
deliverable. Doing so ensures that security knowledge is not something that overwhelms SWEs but
simply applicable to daily practice, eliminating a critical barrier to drive the learning cycle.
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4.6.2 Applying Security Knowledge in Context
Having the management directive and support for secure coding was necessary but not
sufficient to eliminate the barrier to adopting secure development practices. Secure coding requires
a wide range of security knowledge, and providing adequate education and awareness was pointed
out as one major challenge in successfully implementing S-SDLC [46]. While the company provided
SWEs virtual training for secure coding and there were also various guidelines and wiki pages
the SWEs could access, applying the acquired knowledge in everyday work required expertise in
both security and the contextual knowledge of the existing code base. Finding this connection
was challenging for SWEs. Without application, the knowledge gained from training was at best
internalized by individual SWEs, but remained detached from their daily practice. The SWEs
effectively considered security-related tasks as secondary tasks, separate from their primary practice.
To overcome this, a bottom up support was also needed to make real progress. In our fieldwork we
found that such bottom up support happened through the learning cycle identified in the previous
section. The threat modeling and associated security scrum poker meetings, which involved all
SWEs, provided the opportunity for the SecSWE to put the relevant security knowledge into the
concrete context of the software being built. This started the learning dynamics that enabled all
SWEs to progress on the “security dimension.”

4.6.3 The Role of Security Advocates
The work of SecSWE played an important role in facilitating the learning cycle and making security into part of the development team’s preferred practices. SecSWE was a “security
advocate” [42] even before the management pushed to implement S-SDLC. He worked in the devel-
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opment team, and was also assigned to be a part of the virtual security team, providing additional
security resources. Analyzing our data, we find that this structure added more value to security
advocacy, making other SWEs more receptive to his advice as they started to consider it “part of his
job.” Working on the same team provided an important factor in demonstrating the applicability of
the security knowledge in the context of the daily practice. This facilitated SecSWE to contribute
knowledge as applicable to daily practice, helping to drive a productive learning cycle, which was
beneficial to both the rest of the team and SecSWE himself. Through this interactive learning
process, SecSWE was able to better understand the necessary details of the product which allowed
him to apply his security knowledge in a more context-aware manner. Further iterations of this
learning cycle led to more security-aware SWEs in the team.

4.7

Limitations
Our work is limited by a few factors. First, our findings are based on the fieldwork data

collected by a single researcher. Although the researcher had prior training and experience in
conducting participant observation research, the collected data are shaped by the researcher’s positionality (his age, gender, position in the company, and so forth). For example, the researcher did
not have as many interactions with customer service and upper management because of his position
in the company. However, the researcher did build an overall understanding of the company during
the research, and the results were extensively discussed with the broader research group during
analysis to better account for any inherent biases in the data. Second, our findings are based on
the observations of a single company with a particular size and structure. Although we believe
the development team is representative of one in a mid-sized software development company, the
specific challenges of adopting secure development practices and how they were/were not overcome
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may not be directly applicable and generalizable to every company. As such, the model of how a
culture is developed within a software development team might not be comprehensive. Nevertheless,
during data analysis, the team paid particular attention to how results related to common problems
faced in security and software development to ensure that the findings could be relevant to other
companies.

4.8

Recommendations for Companies
Our findings suggest a potentially useful strategy for a small to medium sized company.

Having a security expert as a part of the development team, participating and advocating for
security at every stage of the development process, is beneficial in starting a security culture.
This not only helps cultivate security-aware developers, but also helps the security expert identify
security issues and collectively converge to secure practices that are best suited for the project at
hand. Development of the relevant security knowledge in conjunction with the regular software
development skills promotes secure coding practices which, overtime, become a part of the team
culture. Our research also observed the effect management had in facilitating the positive shift.
Even though the initial efforts focused on the compliance tickets were not effective, the fact that
management made security an explicit goal provided the opportunity for the security advocates to
experiment different strategies that eventually led to positive results.

4.9

Related Work
Our fieldwork was conducted in the backdrop of the company starting to implement a secure

development lifecycle, a concept first articulated by Howard and Lipner [46]. This seminal work
highlighted the importance of education and training in creating S-SDLC. Our findings further indi-
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cate that understanding the learning dynamics, in particular how preferred practices are established
within a software development team through the situated learning framework, can be instrumental
in creating positive changes in secure development.
There is a long line of study on developers’ role in software security. Some used psychological
techniques [77]. Others used surveys and interviews [4, 8, 39, 70, 89, 120] as well as study of code
artifacts [4, 70]. More recently, researchers have used secure coding competitions [86, 110] and
controlled experiments [3, 4, 5, 37, 71] to study the problem. Our work is unique in that we use
long-term participant observation conducted in a real company. The longitudinal study based on
real-world observations allows us to obtain deep insights that are otherwise hard to come out through
snapshots-in-time study or self-reported data.
Palombo et al. [79] used ethnographic methods to study a software company’s secure development processes. The authors indicated that a co-creation model where security experts working
inside the development team could produce positive changes in secure development processes. Our
work revealed the role of learning dynamics in pushing for positive shift in adopting secure development processes. The role situated learning plays in starting a secure development culture is
consistent with the co-creation model.
The SecSWE in our study can be viewed as a “security advocate”, which has been extensively
discussed in recent studies [41, 42, 43]. Our findings on the role of team culture in security awareness
of SWEs echoes that from prior studies. Assal and Chiasson [8] explored how security best practices are integrated into the software development lifecycles and found that company culture is an
influential factor in adoption of security practices. Haney et al. [44] carried out in-depth interviews
to understand cryptographic development and testing practices in organizations and found that
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rigorous secure development and testing practices are guided by a strong security culture within
organizations. They also identify that security experts within the team are critical influences in
the security culture of an organization and in supporting less-experienced personnel. Our findings
confirm the important role security advocates play in starting a security culture, and further provide
guidance on how to make security advocates’ work effective, through understanding the underlying
learning dynamics that drive the formation of a development team’s culture.
There are also past work that examined the effect of learning from experience in software
development [30], and work that analyzed open-source software development using the situated
learning framework [26]. Our work focuses on secure development, and our research findings are
consistent with these earlier works which focused on learning’s role in software development in
general.

4.10

Conclusion
We present an ethnographic study of secure development processes in a software company.

Our research was able to observe the unfolding of implementing a secure development life cycle in
the company. Data analysis shows that a positive shift in developers’ security awareness resulted
from underlying situated learning dynamics, where security knowledge is constantly applied in
the concrete work of the development team. This process drives the establishment of secure coding
practices as the preferred practices of the team, essentially establishing a secure development culture.
We find that a security expert working within the development team could be instrumental in driving
this positive shift.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

The role of human-factors is critical in improving the security of any system. The reasons
of adoption, or failure there of, is usually very nuanced and difficult to understand without gaining
first hand experience. This thesis advocates for the use of long term participant observation research
in order to understand the underlying subtleties of security issues by presenting the findings from
two longitudinal studies.
The study of a transportation management center found that the existence of silos of different
engineering disciplines contributes to the lack of holistic understanding of the complex transportation ecosystem. We present a systematization framework which facilitates the communication of
security knowledge and helps breakdown these silos.
The study of a software development company found that software development team’s
culture is defined by a set of preferred practices which is developed over a period of time through the
underlying interactive learning dynamics within the team. We provide recommendations regarding
the role of management and security advocates within the team in leveraging the learning dynamics
to give rise to security-aware development and promote secure preferred practices within the team
as a first step towards developing a security culture.
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Appendix A: Codebook

Coding of the fieldnote data followed the general guidelines of inductive approach [97] and
grounded theory [10]. It was an iterative process and started after the first three months of the field
work. The research team held weekly meetings to discuss and reflect on the data collected. Themes
and patterns emerged from those discussions and various codes were used to tag the content in the
raw fieldnote. Below is the list of codes used.

• Bug discovery
• Bug discovery:internal
• Communication issue
• Compliance:asvs
• Compliance:csf
• Compliance:csf:thirdparty
• Compliance:encryption
• Compliance:phishing
• Cross product issue
• Customer pressure
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• Feature pressure
• Forgotten issue
• Ignored issue
• Infra
• Infra:legacy
• Infra:security
• Learn
• Learn:best practice
• Learn:figure out
• Learn:peer programming
• Learn:review
• Policy change
• Preferred practice:code
• Preferred practice:support
• Preferred practice:workflow
• Remote work issues
• SME
• SME:handover

104

• SME:new
• Secure development
• Security-aware
• Threat modeling
• Threat modeling:dread
• Training
• Workflow change
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